Public Bill Committee

[Ann Winterton in the Chair]

Clause 42

Period of appointment of Governors to the Board

Michael Gove: I beg to move amendment No. 67, in clause 42, page 45, line 4, at end add—
‘(3) Nothing in this Part of this Act shall affect the exercise or performance of the general functions of the Board of Governors of the Museum assigned to them by section 3 of the Museum of London Act 1965.’.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Lady Winterton. The Minister and all the Front-Bench spokesmen have expressed their gratitude to Mr. O’Hara for his chairmanship of the Committee. I wish again to place on record our thanks to you for the graceful way in which you have chaired our proceedings and we look forward to serving under your chairmanship for the duration of the Committee.
I hope that the purpose of the amendment will be congenial to the Government. All that we want to do is to provide the Museum of London and those whouse the museum, in particular its governors, withthe reassurance that is implicit in everything that the Government have said so far but which, for the convenience of the future trustees and of the Mayor, might be better written into the Bill. The Minister said that, given that the Museum of London deals so explicitly with London’s history and culture, it makes sense in devolutionary terms for its governance tobe in the hands of the Greater London authority, particularly the Mayor. In broad terms, we can see the logic of that.
I am sure that the Committee will be aware that other museums in London, such as the Horniman museum, have a similar constitution to the Museum of London in that they receive grant-in-aid funding from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport but have a particular London focus that would not be covered by the amendment. However, it is appropriate that the Museum of London, because of its specific focus on London’s history and culture, which is not shared by the Horniman museum, should have the benefit of the Mayor’s closer attention.
The purpose of the amendment is to deal with the role of the governors who might be appointed by the Mayor in future. One of the issues on which we need greater assurance is how the change of funding will not lead to a diminution in the independence of the trustees and those charged with the governance of the Museum of London. Because grant will come fromthe Department for Culture, Media and Sport to the Mayor and he will be responsible for giving that grant to the Museum of London, worry has been expressed that he might use the grant to bend the museum to his particular ideological or cultural preoccupations.
We all know that culture policy can sometimes be used for ideological ends. Whether in Vietnam, Cuba or St. Petersburg, museums that have been erected by people or maintained by Administrations have been used not so much to enlighten and inculcate a sense of pride in the nation’s history, but to press a particular ideological agenda.

Stephen Pound: Good afternoon, Lady Winterton. It is always a pleasure to serve at your feet. I ask the hon. Gentleman to resist the temptation to paint a picture of the national newt museum or the national comrade newt museum with which he seems to be threatening us. The Horniman museum to which he referred is different from the Museum of London in that it came from a trust on behalf of a family who were originally tea dealers. The house dates back about 200 years. The Museum of London goes back only to 1965, which is why it has a different structure. Whereas there may be charming and delightful aspects to the management of the Horniman museum, they have grown up over hundreds of years. What we are discussing is actually a pretty sensible structure for management, and it is unlikely that it will become the Che Guevara friends of the newt museum in the immediate future.

Michael Gove: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He underlined the difference in focus and history of the Horniman museum from that of the Museum of London. My point was that current funding arrangements for the Horniman museum and the Museum of London are analogous and we accept that, because of the Museum of London’s distinctive status, it is appropriate that the Mayor should exercise the role envisaged by the Bill for him or for her.
I mentioned Cuba and Vietnam not least because those are two countries that I have visited and whose museums I have had the opportunity to look at. What is striking about the governance of both museums is that they tend to portray one particular slant of the history of both countries in an heroic light. Both museums also seek to demonise other nations in a particular way. I admit that they are examples of museums used for ideological purposes, which are at the further end of our considerations, but it is not impossible for this Mayor, or a future Mayor, to apply pressure through his control of the purse strings to the trustees of the museum that might compromise their essential independence. In pressing this amendment, we seek to secure a provision in the Bill, and an assurance from the Minister, so that the trustees will continue to enjoy the independence that they currently enjoy.

Andrew Slaughter: Having kept fairly close in previous sittings to the brief as set out in the Bill, are we now getting on to the political knockabout? That may dictate how I allocate my time over the rest of this afternoon and how much attention I pay to what is said. If we are going to hear a lot about Hugo Chavez over the next couple of hours, I have some correspondence to get on with. Will the hon. Gentleman stick to the Bill?

Michael Gove: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and pleased to add to his convenience in carrying on the voluminous correspondence with his constituents, which is facilitated by the House of Commons grant of an additional £10,000 to all hon. Members enabling them to maintain that close and intimate relationship. I shall not be labouring points about Fidel Castro, Che Guevara or Hugo Chavez at this point, but a new clause later on will give me an opportunity to return specifically to that topic. That is not because the history of Latin American revolution is close to my heart—although it is—but because it is particularly close to the Mayor’s heart and he indulges that passion at the expense of London’s council tax payers. We want to safeguard them, rather than safeguarding some 1968 image of the revolution. We will have an opportunity to return to that matter when dealing with that new clause.

Martin Linton: Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that the greatest danger to the Museum of London is not that the Mayor or the Department for Culture, Media and Sport are trying to influence it in respect of what it exhibits, but that they may suddenly withdraw funding? Such a fate has caught up with a wonderful small local history museum in the county courthouse in Garratt lane in Wandsworth, which was closed quite peremptorily last week by Wandsworth borough council as a misguided economy measure.

Michael Gove: I am unfamiliar with the details of Wandsworth museum. The history of Wandsworth council’s record of a lower council tax than any other London borough—lower, indeed, than any other borough in the United Kingdom—is one that all hon. Members know and cherish. However, other aspects of the history of Wandsworth and Battersea, not least the fact that Battersea was the first constituency to elect a communist Member of Parliament—

Martin Linton: Shapurji Saklatvala.

Michael Gove: Indeed. Such matters are best commemorated locally. The Wandsworth museum may play a role in doing so, but it is not my role to trespass on the appropriate decisions taken by the locally elected and accountable members of Wandsworth borough council.

Martin Linton: May I recommend that the hon. Gentleman pays that museum a visit before it is closed? He will then be put right on two things. Wandsworth borough council, for all the propaganda that it puts through letterboxes, has not sought to set up a shrine to its low council tax in the Wandsworth museum. In fact, I do not think that it is mentioned at all. However, the hon. Gentleman will see the history of Shapurji Saklatvala, a Labour and also a communist Member of Parliament in the 1920s, although not the first.

Michael Gove: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I note that that former Member for Battersea was both Labour and communist: he was not the first and I am sure—looking at Committee members today—that he will not be last.
The funding arrangement envisaged for the Museum of London would, essentially, mean funding being split 50/50 between the Corporation of London and the GLA. The GLA portion would, we understand, be a ring-fenced grant from the DCMS. But how ring-fenced would that grant be? In addition to our concern about the way in which the Mayor may use his funding for the museum, potentially, to influence the trustees and the governance and its contents, we are also concerned that he might say thank you to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport for that grant and then say, “The exigencies of governing London mean that I’ve got to raid it.” That means that a larger burden potentially falls on the Corporation of London, which may have to go to court to ensure that the Mayor honours his commitment to spend the money that he has been given appropriately. If it does not, it might have to pay rather more than its fair share of the costs of the museum without having the decisive say that the Mayor will have been given in the appointment of governors.
The amendment seeks two assurances from the Minister to the corporation, Londoners and future trustees. First, will the money from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport be effectively ring-fenced so that the corporation is not put into an invidious position and the Mayor can ensure that money set aside for the Museum of London stays there? Secondly, will the absolute independence and integrity of the trustees and those charged with governance of the Museum of London be protected against this Mayor or any future Mayor who attempts to use that prestigious site to push an agenda that is not in the interests of all London?

Michael Fabricant: Is it not apposite today, given the statement of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport on the licence fee, to draw a comparison with BBC funding? The BBC’s integrity and independence are enshrined in the Broadcasting Acts and its charter. Is not my hon. Friend asking for a similar assurance? There is a precedent in the BBC. Funding is passed on—in the BBC’s case, from the licence payer through the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Treasury, which sets the licence fee—ensuring independence and protection for the BBC’s board of governors. My hon. Friend is asking for similar protection for the Museum of London.

Michael Gove: My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. He is well known as a broadcasting expert in both legislative and operational terms, and the distinction that he draws is valid. I appreciate that throughout her time in office, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport has had a lively appreciation of how BBC governance can effectively ensure its operational independence.
I emphasise that existing legislation produced and presided over by this Government provides an effective guarantee. The Bill has raised doubts in some people’s  minds as to whether those guarantees will be kept as secure as they are at the moment. I am sure that the Minister will want to reassure us that the Government will be consistent in maintaining their integrity, and I hope that she will accept the amendment in that spirit.

Yvette Cooper: Hon. Members have asked a series of questions connected with the amendment, and I will try to respond to them. It is the Government’s intention, as the amendment says, that:
“Nothing in this Part of this Act shall affect the exercise or performance of the general functions of the Board of Governors of the Museum assigned to them by section 3 of the Museum of London Act 1965”.
I reiterate the amendment’s wording to put it on the parliamentary record because that is certainly the intention behind the clauses. We do not, however, believe that the amendment is needed. It is unnecessary because it restates the impact of our proposals.
The Bill will not give the GLA and the Mayor any greater power respecting the museum than the Government have under the Museum of London Act 1965, which clearly establishes the board of governors’ functions and powers in relation to the museum’s operations. They include all matters of the care and display of collections, the employment of staff, the loan, acquisition and disposal of objects, the provision of archaeological services and the kinds of exhibition run. None of that will change as a result of the Bill. It will merely amend the 1965 Act to replace references to the Secretary of State with references to the GLA.
Hon. Members raised specific questions about the appointments process. The nine board members currently appointed by the Prime Minister will in future be appointed by the Mayor, but the City of London will continue to appoint the other nine members to maintain a balance on the board. The museum will continue to be a charity and thus will be bound to ensure that it complies with its duties as set out in the Act.
As far as the funding is concerned, clause 43(5) requires the GLA to pay a sum equal to that given to the museum by the City of London, unless both parties agree that they should pay a different proportion of the expenses incurred by the museum. The City, however, is not obliged to match extra funding provided by the GLA unless it so chooses. So in fact there are far greater obligations on the GLA than on the City to ensure that funding is in place.
We think that the appropriate measures are in place to ensure that the current arrangements and operating procedures of the board and of the museum will continue, but we think that it is right that the current functions exercised by Government Departments and by the Prime Minister should be exercised by the Mayor instead. On that basis I ask the hon. Member for Surrey Heath to withdraw his amendment.

Michael Gove: I am grateful to the Minister for those assurances. They are broadly along the lines that we had hoped for. I must enter a note of personal regret, however. The Minister said that our amendment was captured by the spirit of her remarks, and so I believe it was. There is, therefore, no objection in principle to our amendment. So far in my 18 months in the House, I have had absolutely no luck in getting my name scribbled into the statute book. Given that the Minister agrees with my amendment, I had thought that perhaps I would have the opportunity to tell my mum that I had changed Government legislation. My mum will be disappointed to know that, even when the Government agree with me 100 per cent., they still will not give me the credit. Nevertheless, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 43 to 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Common provision of administrative, professional and technical services

Andrew Pelling: I beg to move amendment No. 68, in clause 48, page 48, line 16, at end insert—
‘(8) Any constituent body proposing to enter into any arrangements under subsection (2) shall have regard to the needs and requirements of any constituent body with which it proposes to enter into such an agreement.
(9) In making any arrangements under subsection (2) above the Mayor shall ensure that the Authority secures adequate resources from the constituent body proposing to enter into any agreements under subsection (2) to fulfil its functions.
(10) For the purposes of subsections (8) and (9) the Mayor and the Assembly shall be treated as if they were constituent bodies separate and distinct within the Authority.’.
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Lady Winterton. The position that the London assembly took on clause 48 was that it was very supportive of the principle behind the provisions and, clearly, there are many efficiencies to be secured by sharing services within the GLA group. I take this opportunity to put on record the credit that is due to the chief finance officer of the GLA, Anne McMeel, for the very good work that she is undertaking in that area to secure the best efficiencies, by the working together of the GLA family constituent bodies.
The assembly is concerned to ensure that it is not denied access to resources that are currently shared by the Mayor and the assembly. That covers a range of important support services, such as financial, legal, procurement and human resources advice, together with information and technology services and, indeed, library services. If some of the services are undertaken for the strategic GLA by a constituent body, such as Transport for London, there is a risk that sufficient safeguards would not exist to ensure that the assembly continues to be provided with adequate support services.
We have discussed putting a cap on the assembly’s budget, but amendments have also considered a floor. I know that the Government did not accept them, but it seems a reasonable idea. The amendment would  mitigate the risk to resources expected to be applied to the assembly and ensure that they are safeguarded and guaranteed.

Yvette Cooper: The Government recognise the intentions behind the amendment, but we believe that the changes are unnecessary. The amendment would place additional duties on the GLA and any other constituent functional body in delegating back-office functions to each other and would require those constituent bodies to have regard to the others’ needs and requirements. Proposed subsection (9) would require the Mayor to ensure that the GLA secures adequate resources from a functional body before entering into an arrangement with it.
Subsection (10) defines the Mayor and assembly, rather than the GLA as a whole, as constituent bodies. We do not think that its overall impact is necessary to the Bill. For a start, any arrangement between the constituent bodies concerning back-office functions would be made only with the agreement of those bodies, so they will be able to take into account each others’ needs and ensure that their own requirements are properly safeguarded.
Equally, we find it hard to envisage that the Mayor would agree to take on a functional body’s back-office functions without securing adequate resources to do so from the body concerned. In any event, it is the Mayor and assembly who set those bodies’ functional budgets, and they will be able to take into account any transfer of back-office functions in doing so.

Andrew Pelling: I am grateful to the Minister for accepting many of the points made, although she does not consider it necessary to make the change. The circumstances are particular because of how the budgetary process is agreed in the assembly, as we have discussed during debate on other clauses. Because the assembly must decide by a two-thirds majority, it is possible for the assembly’s budget to be decided by the blocking third minority. It is therefore likely that any Mayor supported by that blocking minority could direct that significant resources should be withdrawn from the assembly while securing efficiencies by working with GLA family bodies.

Yvette Cooper: We have discussed the nature of the assembly’s role and the Mayor’s role in determining the budget. The Government think that there are adequate safeguards to ensure that the assembly has the resources it needs and can exercise its scrutiny function properly.
With reference to the proposals, we should recognise that back-office functions at city hall are already usually shared between the Mayor and the assembly. The clause will require the Mayor to consult the assembly before entering into any arrangement for the GLA to delegate or take on functional bodies’ back-office functions. The assembly will also be free to agree protocols or service level agreements with any functional body that provides a back-office function for the GLA.
We think that the amendment’s intentions are already captured in the Bill. A series of appropriate mechanisms—protocols, existing arrangements, the budget and the Mayor’s requirement to consult—will provide the kind of safeguard that hon. Members require.

Bob Neill: I shall be brief. We have already discussed the assembly’s situation in relation to consultation. Provided that the Mayor meets the requirements of the other clauses that we have agreed will stand part of the Bill, the Mayor can ignore the assembly. So the safeguard is not much of a safeguard. Does the Minister accept that when one is dealing with, for example, the assembly’s ability to access human resources advice and support, or legal advice—which is particularly important—or financial advice, it is important that the assembly have some guarantee of access? There is already discussion—in broad terms I support it—on consolidating the legal arrangements under Transport for London rather than under the core GLA. It would make sense if the assembly had more than the right to be consulted, if it is to guarantee itself access to legal advice on the functions of the organisation of which it is part.

Yvette Cooper: We think that the existing arrangements will be sufficient, although there are additional proposals on protocols and on the budget. What we are discussing is merely the ability to combine back-office functions to deliver services, rather than proposals to reduce, change or amend the services that are provided. The measure is simply a practical one and we do not believe that the additional amendments are required. On that basis I ask the hon. Member for Croydon, Central to consider withdrawing his amendments.

Andrew Pelling: I am grateful for the Minister’s conscientious response. Nevertheless I feel that it would be helpful if the matter went to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 49 to 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2

Repeals

Bob Neill: I beg to move amendment No. 48, in schedule 2, page 53, line 33, at end insert—
‘Police Act 1996 (c.16)
Schedule 2A (as inserted by the Police and Justice Act 2006).’.

Ann Winterton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment No. 47, in schedule 2, page 54, line 3, at end add—
‘Schedule 26.’.
New clause 23—Greater London Authority to be police authority for London—
‘(1) The Police Act 1996 (c.16) is amended as follows.
(2) After section 5A insert—
“5AA Police Authority for London
(1) The Greater London Authority shall be the police authority for the metropolitan police district.
(2) All executive functions in respect of the role of the Greater London Authority as a police authority shall be carried out by the Mayor of London.
(3) The London Assembly shall have power to scrutinise the exercise of the Mayor’s functions under subsection (2) above and to carry out all scrutiny of the work of the police force as was previously carried out by the Metropolitan Police Authority.
(4) All references to the Metropolitan Police Authority in this and any other enactment shall be construed in accordance with this section.
5AB Budget
The Mayor shall set the component part of the GLA budget previously set by the Metropolitan Police Authority—
5AC Assembly Police Committee
(1) The London Assembly shall establish a committee to carry out its functions under section 5AA(3) above.
(2) Four Magistrates, appointed in the same manner as Magistrate members of the Metropolitan Police Authority were, shall be co-operated members of this committee.”
(3) Leave out sections 5B and 5C and Schedule 2A.’.
New clause 24—Appointment of Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis—
‘(1) The Police Act 1996 (c.16) is amended as follows.
(2) For section 9B(5) substitute—
“(5) Before recommending to Her Majesty that she appoint a person as the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, the Secretary of State shall have regard to—
(a) any recommendations made to him by the Mayor of London, and
(b) any representations made to him by the London Assembly.”.’.
New clause 25—Appointment of Deputy Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis—
‘(1) The Police Act 1996 (c.16) is amended as follows.
(2) For section 9D(5) substitute—
“(5) Before recommending to Her Majesty that she appoint a person as the Deputy Commissioner, the Secretary of State shall have regard to—
(a) any recommendations made to him by the Mayor of London, and
(b) any representations made to him by the Commissioner.”.’.
New clause 45—Removal of requirement that the Deputy Mayor be a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority—
‘Omit paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 2A to the Police Act 1996(c. 16).’.

Bob Neill: I wish to express my pleasure at seeing you back in the Chair for the remainder of the Bill’s progress, Lady Winterton. I hope that the proceedings will not take too long, but the topic under discussion is particularly important. This package of amendments and new clauses, on which we shall want to vote at the appropriate time, is central to policing.
In many ways, policing is one of the key areas of the GLA group’s responsibility and the way in which it is handled at the moment is needlessly diffuse. Policing is regularly in the top one or two worries of Londoners. Polls regard it as very important. Successful policing in London is vital to the future of the city and our amendments would strengthen the role of the Mayor in it. I hope that our approach gives the lie to earlier suggestions that we are opposed to a strategic authority. We are not. We want to make sure that it and the Mayor as its elected strategic head concentrate on matters that are genuinely strategic and can clearly only be delivered sensibly on a pan-London basis. Policing manifestly fits that bill. That is why we are worried that the present arrangements are something of a hotch-potch.
Everyone expects the Mayor of London to have a keen interest and involvement in policing. The Government have said before during our proceedings that they are wedded to the strong mayor model. Looking at the experience particularly of north America, a strong mayor model suggests to most ordinary Londoners and observers a direct involvement in policing matters. Everyone thinks of Rudolph Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg in New York. What do they know about them? There was a problem with policing in New York. Mayor Giuliani was elected; Mayor Giuliani was the man who was credited with fixing it. Had he got it wrong, he would have paid the penalty by losing office.
It seems that city-dwellers strongly link the idea of a strong, executive Mayor with the idea that that person should be answerable for policing and community safety issues. We should not think in terms of narrow policing, but as a broader point, people expect that direct linkage.
If we ask the average Londoner what the Mayor should do, the answer would be that he should certainly sort out transport and policing, and make sure that the streets are safe. Worry about safety throughout the city is regularly at the top of Londoners’ concerns; although we might disagree about some of the detail, it is something on which there is a consensus. Safety is vital to any civilised city and for London to maintain its pre-eminence as a world city—some would say, “the” world city—getting it safe is crucial. People would expect that the Mayor should have direction of that key policy, but in fact the system does not give him that clear and transparent direction or a clear sense of accountability. That position might have arisen, as is often the way, deep in the mists of the discussions in the Government when the original scheme for the legislation was pulled together.
As I observed earlier in Committee, there is no particular magic to the composition of any of the functional bodies. They evolved perhaps for historic purposes and for functional reasons. Nor is there particular magic in the composition of the policy authority. The fact that we have a police authority for London is, I concede, an improvement on the position when the Home Secretary was the police authority. That is a step in the right direction, which is why I was willing to argue the case for a London-wide city governance when it was not always fashionable to do so in my party. I do not criticise the work of members of the Metropolitan Police Authority. I could hardly do that, since I am one of its members. However, that does not alter the fact that accountability is not straightforward, and not as good as it could be. We are seeking to improve the means by which policing is welded into the mainstream of mayoral functions and city government.
Tony Travers, the academic to whom we referred earlier, said that the structure that came out of the discussions between various Government Departments on how the new Greater London authority should be set up leaves something of a mangle. It is clear to anyone who has read the literature, or who has looked at the history of the matter, that the Home Office fought like a cat in a sack to avoid the handover of significant policing powers to London.
I give credit to the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Mr. Raynsford) for his work on the Greater London Authority Act 1999, because he managed to fight off some of the rearguard action of the Home Office. Now, six years after the event, weare seeking to go further toward the logic that that right hon. Gentleman may have had in mind, namely that people expect the Mayor to have executive responsibility for policing. By executive responsibility, I do not mean operational control. In our system, politicians do not have operational control of the police at any level, and neither should they. Executive responsibility should be executive in the sense that the Mayor should be intimately involved in the appointment of the commissioner and other key staff, give the strategic overview and thrust to policing in London, and be the person who is politically accountable, who carries the can for policing in London. That is what we are seeking to do here. The system, despite its good intentions and its halfway move forward, is difficult.
Mr. Travers, in his useful book, “The Politics of London”, refers to a four-way split of accountability for policing, something that I think no one would dispute. We have the Mayor, who has responsibility for setting the budget, and for appointing some members of the Metropolitan Police Authority. He is also consulted on the appointment of the commissioner. The assembly has an involvement. Assembly members are accountable, in a sense, because they set the budget. Of course, without rehashing our earlier discussions, the assembly can only set the budget on high-level terms, and cannot get into the detail. Some members of the assembly serve on the authority and others do not, meaning that the accountability of assembly members to their constituents on policing matters varies. Because I happen to be a member of the authority, it is much easier for me to take up issues of policing in Bexley and Bromley than it is for, say, my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, Central, who does not have the same ease of access. Is that situation logical?
The Metropolitan Police Authority itself has responsibility. It carries out certain limited, non-operational executive functions, and has a scrutinyrole. In practice, however, the scrutiny role of the authority—its members would concede—is much less developed than the scrutiny role of the assembly. The current chair of the authority, an old and respected friend of myself and the Minister, is conscious of that situation, and has sought to improve it since he took over. The fact is that the scrutiny role of the MPA is much less than one might expect.
The final strand of accountability is the commissioner himself. He is responsible for day-to-day operations and has a line of accountability not only to the Mayor, the authority and the assembly, but to the Home Secretary, who sits somewhere in all of this as well. That is inevitable because of London’s position as the capital city, but we could make things a lot easier with a little rationalisation, which is what we are suggesting.
Against the background of at least four and arguably five lines of accountability for London, it is not easy for Mr., Mrs. or Ms Londoner to know who carries the can if anything goes wrong with policing in London, or who should have the praise when things go well. Who is ultimately accountable? It could, in theory, be any one or any mixture of those. That does not sit well with the Government’s apparent commitment to improving accountability and transparency in service delivery, something that we agree with in principle.
For that reason, it is not surprising that the previous Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir John Stevens, now Lord Stevens, has said himself on a numberof occasions that he found the accountability arrangements difficult to deal with. Once he said to the assembly’s budget committee in some exasperation, “I don’t know who I’m supposed to be accountable for.” I do not think that it was entirely in jest. The situation is needlessly confused. If Lord Stevens felt that, I suspect that the average London resident does as well.
Despite the best of intentions in trying to find a compromise that would satisfy the Home Office and the other conflicting Departments and could be reconciled with the Government’s desire for city-wide governance, perhaps part of the error lay in saying that the Metropolitan Police Authority should try to replicate as far as it could in London the Government system for police authorities elsewhere—a certain number of “local authority” or equivalent assembly members, some magistrates and some independents. That is why it differs from the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, which had an established model involving borough councillors instead. One might think that LFEPA would have been a better model for a separate functional body system in London.
The error was to assume that what works and is appropriate elsewhere in the country should be appropriate in London. We argue that it is not. London is unique in size and complexity. It is not necessary to have the same governance structure here as in the rest of the country for governing the city or delivering services such as policing. The GLA was intended to be a unique solution to a unique situation. London is by far the largest city in western Europe and one of the largest in the western world, and it needs its own tailor-made structures.
Those structures should have democratic accountability. That accountability is provided by the Mayor and the assembly, both of which have mandates. That is why we propose effectively to place the Mayor and the assembly as the police authority for London, and that is how the new clauses are structured. Executive power would go to the Mayor, as most people would expect, as well as the MPA’s executive functions. The Mayor would not gain any greater operational control, but accountability would clearly focus on him. When he stands for election saying, “I am going to do something about policing in London,” it will be a pledge that he cannot get away from, because it will be his legal responsibility.
Scrutiny, which is vital and could be improved, falls to the assembly, which the Government concede is a scrutiny body meant to deal with such issues. Our proposed system fits very well with the Government’s own rhetoric earlier in the Committee’s proceedings. It would mean that all London assembly members could scrutinise the work of the police. Every constituency member will have the same degree of access, and members elected on a London-wide, non-constituency basis—the argument being that they will be able to represent more broadly with a non-geographic constituency—would have the same access and ability. I submit that that would give much better and more logical scrutiny, as the entire assembly would be involved.
We accept that the particular role of magistrates should be preserved, so we have provided for an entrenched committee, which I shall come to in a moment. Under the current arrangement, the Mayor negotiates with the MPA, which then makes a budget bid to the Mayor. We say that the Mayor has the executive power—that is explicit in the new clause—and he would set the policing component of the budget. That would be scrutinised by the assembly and the budget process would then take place. Nothing would change in that respect. There would still be a separate policing component within which the Mayor would doubtless negotiate with the commissioner and the assembly’s police committee.
New clause 23 would set up a specific police committee. There are two reasons for doing that: the particular importance of policing, which is the No. 1 or No. 2 concern of Londoners, and the fact that policing is the service that consumes two thirds of the council tax precept, so it is particularly appropriate that there should be a specific safeguard on police scrutiny.
The assembly has, voluntarily, a transport committee to scrutinise the work of Transport for London, but under the proposal it would be obliged to have a police committee, whose members would of course all have democratic mandates. To preserve the particular, valuable insight that can be given by magistrate members, we propose that that committee—uniquely of those in the GLA—should have four co-opted magistrate members who could be involved in the deliberations. That would preserve an analogy with other UK practice, but tailor the situation to the circumstances in London.
We do not propose independent members, because we think that the wide range of experience of all25 assembly members adequately covers the experience that might be required through independent members if there was a narrower so-called political membership. I respect the work of my independent colleagues on the police authority, but the key point is that they have no mandate from anyone, other than through a process of selection and appointment. Under our system, everybody with executive control—the Mayor—or who was involved in scrutiny in the assembly would have a democratic mandate, which would make policing for London more transparent and accountable, and reduce some of the bureaucracy that has resulted from the compromise that we suspect represents the gestation of the current arrangements.
That is the thinking, and we submit that it accords well with the Government’s logic. We therefore invite them to accept the amendment, which would enhance delivery of policing and allow Londoners to feel that there was a clear chain of responsibility that they could call upon when necessary.

Andrew Pelling: I am happy to support my hon. Friend. It is interesting to note the comments made by Tony Travers in the book to which my hon. Friend referred; he is very critical of the assembly in not scrutinising the work of the Metropolitan police.
It is important to pass on some recollections of how the assembly kicked off on the issue of policing scrutiny, so that Committee colleagues understand how the establishment of a separate Metropolitan Police Authority made it difficult for assembly members to hold the police service to account in the way that they would have expected a London authority to do. The Metropolitan Police Service was very willing to give an initial briefing to assembly members, but one of the key messages from that briefing in the first week of the London assembly’s existence in 2000 was that the police service did not believe that the Greater London Authority Act 1999 provided the assembly with any role in the scrutiny of police service performance. As far as it was concerned, that was specifically the role of the Metropolitan Police Authority and its board, not assembly members.
That culture was further enforced by the approach that the current Mayor took on police service accountability, which may well have developed because it was important to be able to create the political capital required for his credibility. Bearing in mind his—and perhaps Lee Jasper’s—alleged baggage in their approaches to the police service, his style was that he had nothing to do with the operation of the police service and was not accountable to the assembly forit, because virtually everything that it did was an operational matter on which he was not accountable. If London assembly members want to ask questions about the performance of particular borough commands or specific parts of the police service, the Mayor’s response is that it is not his responsibility, but that of the commissioner.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst also referred to the first experience of the assembly’s budget committee in dealing with the then commissioner, Lord Stevens. He turned up with as much regalia as possible dripping from his uniform so as to intimidate members of the assembly’s budget committee. More importantly, he gave us a strong message that he was sick and tired of being accountable to the Home Secretary, the Mayor, the London assembly, its budget committee and the  Metropolitan Police Authority. Such a diffusion of accountability means that there is no worthwhile accountability at all.

Stephen Pound: Far be it from me to correct the hon. Gentleman, but only those in the monarchy wear regalia. He may have been referring to insignia. On the substance of his amendment, does he accept that there was a time, when I was first elected to the House, when the only opportunity to discuss these matters was in the annual debate on policing in London, on a motion tabled by the Home Secretary? That was outrageous. Therefore, there may be problems for people such as Lord Stevens, but does the hon. Gentleman not at least accept that it is vastly better to have a little too much democracy, rather than the previous system, under which there was a massive democratic deficit?

Andrew Pelling: My recollection is that not only royalty wear regalia. I appreciate the royal nature of regalia, due to the very definition of the word, but I understand that masons also would find themselves happily—

Jonathan R Shaw: Where are they?

Andrew Pelling: I am sure, Lady Winterton, that there are none here.

Stephen Pound: Maybe they are royalty!

Andrew Pelling: The hon. Gentleman has been watching too many films. I would accept that there was a significant democratic deficit. Indeed, it led to a great deal of additional inefficiency in the Metropolitan police, which was turning up to the Home Secretary every year and saying, “Terribly sorry, we have overspent, so would you mind making up that financial deficit?” However, it is not a sufficient argument to say that there was a democratic deficit before and that we should not close it entirely by having a more democratic, direct fulfilment of that deficit.
The response given by Lord Stevens on that occasion showed just how ridiculous those demands were in terms of the diffusion of accountability. It meant that none of those groups was in a strong position to call for proper accountability. Those issues are important when there are problems with police service performance and, in particular, crime clear-up rates in London, which unfortunately are spectacularly low. We cannot fulfil the electorate’s desire to put direct pressure on those they elect to increase the police service’s performance.
So much diffusion of accountability results in a feeling among Londoners that they cannot hold their police service to account. An example that is causing a great deal of controversy is the safer neighbourhood panels being established in the context of the much-welcomed safer neighbourhood teams. The police service itself is appointing representatives to the panels that will hold it to account. I have been so uncharitable as to describe the panels as unelected soviets.
 What is particularly galling to elected representatives, whether they be London assembly members or Members of Parliament, is that when they ask about particular priorities in their neighbourhoods, the response is often that those self-appointed panels will set the priorities for neighbourhood policing in their wards. The elected representatives will have no role or input. Indeed, the commissioner’s guidelines state that politicians, whether councillors or MPs, should be specifically excluded from the process. The accountability issues are very real.
One might have expected the Metropolitan Police Authority to be effective in its scrutiny role, but my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst has referred to how the MPA has fallen short in that regard. I am not surprised that that has happened. I have a great deal of sympathy for my colleagues who have served on the MPA. Like Ministers—who, weighed down by red boxes, might be distracted from key issues—their agenda has often been set well in terms of its weight and no end of visits to be made. In many ways, the MPA has been happy to act as a loyal supporters’ club for the commissioner rather than as an effective scrutiny body.
We have taken a radical approach to the Bill, and our amendments are part of that process. Our proposals are democratic and fit in with the Conservative party’s approach in other parts of the UK—we seek direct election of chief commissioners accountable for policing. It is only logical that the Mayor should provide that role in London.
I shall make a brief detour by saying how muchwe value your chairmanship, Lady Winterton, and contrast it with that of the chairman of the assembly, who has recently joined us and who has a direct approach with witnesses before the assembly, as was shown yesterday. Conservatives support that strongly. It shows the robustness of the democratic process in the London assembly.
We have sought to maintain responsibilities for planning and housing at the local government level, the lowest level of government, and to devolve powers from the Government office for London and from the Government in areas such as learning and skills and the national health service. The amendments offer the Committee the opportunity to secure a radical reform of London’s governance that would provide for direct accountability for performance in the police service.

Tom Brake: It isa pleasure to see you here this afternoon, Lady Winterton. Given Mr. O’Hara’s departure, I was worried that the Committee might be left rudderless, but clearly that is not the case.
Some amendments and new clauses in the group are interesting. The worry about the amendments tabled by the hon. Gentlemen who have just spoken is that they are perhaps a step too far in the direction of giving the Mayor executive power. Their argument suggested that the Mayor would simply become the person who was accountable for, rather than having operational responsibility for, the Metropolitan Police Service. There is anxiety that, by their very nature, Mayors might be interested in more power, not less. I can foresee circumstances in which a Mayor who feels the pressure of an underperforming police service might consider that he or she wants to grasp more operational control over the service than people deem to be acceptable.
The new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath about the appointment of seven borough representatives has been withdrawn. The only point that I would make therefore is that, had it been discussed, we would have supported it. The move towards borough-based policing with safer neighbourhood teams with active involvement of the boroughs on the ground suggests that it would be entirely appropriate for borough representatives to be part of the Metropolitan Police Authority, although I recognise the important role that independents have played. There is an issue about the democratic deficit that applies with the role of independents on the police authority.
With the withdrawal of new clause 9, I shall touch briefly on new clause 45. I have not withdrawn it, unless someone else has done so without my knowledge. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath talked earlier about how his mother was watching his progress carefully in this place and said that he wanted to give her a concrete example of his achievements since his election, such as an amendment that was his own. Well, my mother also follows carefully my progress in Parliament. She has done so during the past 10 years and I think that she probably has a more realistic view than the hon. Gentleman’s mother about the success of Opposition Members in identifying amendments that they can claim as their own. However, new clause 45 may give me the opportunity to do so. It has the unanimous support of assembly members and I hope, therefore, the support of the Government.

Andrew Pelling: That is not the case.

Tom Brake: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman who spoke from a sedentary position might like to intervene at some point.

Andrew Pelling: The new clauses are excellent, but they do not have the London assembly blessing.

Tom Brake: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his brief intervention. It did not give me much meat with which to work, but I hear his point.
New clause 45 would make a simple change. I hope that the Government will consider that it is reasonable. It is entirely in keeping with our debate about giving the Mayor greater control over things for which he is rightly responsible. Under the 1999 Act, the deputy Mayor must be a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority. We must question why that is the case. It would be appropriate for the deputy Mayor to be a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, but I do not understand why it is a requirement.

Michael Gove: The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech in pursuit of his analysis of our amendments and new clauses. In the unfortunate absence of the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough, the traditional role of Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of State has now passed to the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush, who will no doubt construe that as a reward for his loyalty in the debate about a single waste authority for London.
I can tell from the downcast looks on the faces of the hon. Members for Mitcham and Morden, for Ealing, North and for Battersea that their energetic support for the Government has not yet been rewarded as the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush has shown it can be.

Tom Brake: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, although it bears no close relation to new clause 45. I shall take it as an endorsement of what I am advocating.
The serious point is that there is no strong argument for the deputy Mayor having to be a member of the MPA. As my colleagues on the GLA have pointed out, in the past six years or thereabouts the deputy Mayor has not been able to play a greater role than she might have on the MPA because she has had other significant interests. The fact that the Police Act 1996 requires her to be a member of the MPA has stopped the Mayor from having a third active member representing the Labour party on that authority. That is one simple reason why I hope that the Government will support the amendment, which would enable the Mayor, their supporter and fan, to have a third active member representing him on the MPA. This straightforward proposal would create an opportunity for someone who has time and commitment to focus on the role and is not distracted by other important matters.
The new clause is about devolving power to the Mayor, and the Government say that they want to take power from central Government and hand it to the Mayor. Allowing the Mayor to determine the responsibilities of his or her deputy would be entirely straightforward. For once, I am absolutely convinced that when the Minister responds and clarifies the Government’s position on new clause 45, it will turn out that I have their full support.

Yvette Cooper: I welcome the debate that we have had; hon. Members have argued their cases well. I should like a clarification before I continue. Am I right in thinking that Opposition Members have withdrawn new clause 9?
 Michael Gove indicated assent.

Yvette Cooper: As the hon. Gentleman is nodding, it seems that they have. That is some relief to me, as I was trying to work out how hon. Members could vote on both the new clauses at the same time, given the contradictions between them.
New clause 23, the central one, would subsume the MPA into the Greater London authority, and other amendments are in many ways consequential on it. I shall come back to new clause 45, which the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington raised in the interests of his mum.
 Policing in England and Wales is managed through a tripartite arrangement that assigns a national strategic role to the Home Secretary, operational independence to chief constables—or, in this case, the commissioner—and accountability for the performance and setting of local  priorities to police authorities. Police authorities have a statutory responsibility to consult local people on their priorities for local policing and to reflect them in the local annual policing plans for the chief officer of police to deliver. They are distinct from local authorities; that delineation was brought more sharply into focus under the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994, through which the then Conservative Government cut muchof the link between local government and policeauthorities.

Tom Brake: I wonder whether the Minister has noticed, on the subject of magistrates, that proposed new section 5AC(2) of the Police Act 1996, as laid out in proposed new clause 23(2) states:
“Four magistrates...shall be co-operated members of this committee.”
Does the Minister have the same difficulty as I do in understanding what a “co-operated member” is?

Yvette Cooper: I am sure that the official Opposition Members who tabled the new clause will be happy to tell us what “co-operated” means. I congratulate the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington on spotting the term “co-operated”, and suggest that perhaps I did not read the small print of the proposed new clause quite as closely as I should have done to spot it myself.

Bob Neill: I thank the Minister for giving way as it enables me to congratulate the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington on having read the detail of the amendment paper with the tenacity of which Billy Bonds would have been proud. There is a typological error: the proposed new clause should, of course, refer to “co-opted” members, which was the phrase that I used in my speech, but which did not find its way into print. If there is a means of rectifying that, I will be guided as to how it might be done.

Yvette Cooper: I thank both hon. Members for their questions, tenacity and clarifications.

Andrew Pelling: It is always important to look at the detail of such things. By way of clarification, when I referred to a lack of assembly blessing, I was not talking about proposed new clause 45, tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington, which has assembly blessing. I was referring to the proposed new clause tabled by myself and my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst.

Yvette Cooper: It must be of some disappointmentto the official Opposition Members who are also members of the assembly that the assembly is not prepared to back their new clauses, and is instead prepared enthusiastically to endorse the new clauses tabled by Members on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench.
The composition of police authorities currently reflects an historic balance, between local councillors and magistrates. More recently, there has been an injection of independent members of the community. The model for police authorities is set out in the Police Act 1996. The Metropolitan Police Authority has23 members, including a majority of one from the Greater London assembly.
Independent members of police authorities were introduced as part of the last Conservative Government’s reforms, and were first appointed in 1995. Independent members were introduced to provide a greater skill base to police authorities, and to increase the diversity of authorities. I recognise the important points made by hon. Members on the diversity of GLA members and council members throughout the country. The points were well argued and I have some sympathy with them. Equally, hon. Members will understand that there are other arguments in favour of having independent members of police authorities. Looking across the country, we see that independent members offer greater diversity and a wider range of skills. Of the last appointment of independent members to police authorities in 2003, 21.5 per cent. were from minority ethnic groups, compared with 4.2 per cent. of councillor members and 4.6 per cent. of magistrate members. Women made up 46.3 per cent. of independent members, compared with 23 per cent. of councillor members and 28.5 per cent. of magistrate members. That is an important consideration.

Michael Gove: The Minister made an important point, and we are all committed to greater diversity when it comes to executive and legislative bodies. However, the logic of her point is that it is not for parties and those that compete for elected office to look to their own diversity policies to provide redress, but for legislators’ powers of executive appointment. Would the Minister say that that is an argument for the continued exercise of appointment, rather than election, to the House of Lords? Would she not agree that the real way to resolve the problem is not through the continued use of patronage but through political parties paying closer attention to the need for diversity?

Ann Winterton: Order. Before the Minister responds, I remind her that the Committee cannot debate the composition of the Lords.

Yvette Cooper: Thank you, Lady Winterton, but tempting as it might be to have a wider debate about the composition of the House of Lords—

Stephen Pound: Resist.

Yvette Cooper: As my hon. Friend reminds me, I should resist it.
As I said, they are important arguments, and I have some sympathy with what hon. Members have said, because democratic accountability is important. However, I point hon. Members to the fact that greater diversity is being added by independent members. I strongly believe that the obligation on political parties is greatly to increase diversity. That is exactly what the Labour party has done both nationally and locally, with particularly strong action to increase representation of women in elected positions. I would strongly urge Opposition Members, who do not have such a strong record in that area, to follow suit.
There are wider issues, however, to do with skills and the need for a mix of different experiences. Indeed, the Police and Justice Act 2006 provides for regulations on the selection of independents; they need to be drawn up, but assembly members will play an important role in the appointment of additional independent members to the MPA. That reflects the point that Opposition Members made—that additional diversity that can be gained from co-opting. That approach is in some ways already reflected in the 2006 Act.
The 2006 Act also made a series of other changes, providing for more flexibility in how members of the MPA and other police authorities in England and Wales are appointed. In particular, it provides that the MPA is to consist of the Mayor, if he chooses to be a member, and those members of the London assembly appointed by him, and others, including at least one lay justice. The Mayor and the members of the assembly must constitute the majority of the members of the authority. The Mayor of London is to chair the authority should he choose to be a member ofthe authority; if not, he must appoint a chairman from among the members of the authority.
The provisions of the 2006 Act clearly strengthen the mayoral role; it gives the Mayor the important role of chairman, which strengthens his position. As I said, the non-assembly members will be appointed by the existing members of the MPA from those on a shortlist prepared by a selection panel.
Those measures, made under the 2006 Act, were debated by both Houses and approved relatively recently. That is why we are resisting the amendments. We believe that there has been considerable discussion, although I recognise that there is always the wider issue of the accountability of the police in a democracy. We will need sophisticated arrangements to ensure proper accountability and scrutiny, but also to allow complete operational independence for the police.
I hope that hon. Members will forgive me a slightly sceptical moment. Had the Government proposed the amendments, I suspect that Opposition Members would be leaping up to argue against them, as they have done with parts of the Bill, whether it be on planning, museums or any other area. They might be saying that the interests of the boroughs were not sufficiently protected or that the Mayor had too much scope and might start intervening in all kinds of detail, which they would not want to happen. I congratulate Opposition Members on their dexterity and nimble-footedness in leaping swiftly to the other side of the argument. It is the strength of a good Opposition—what we would normally think of as a good Liberal Democrat approach—although perhaps not on this occasion.
The House has obviously debated the matter before, and I am sure that it will be debated again in order to ensure the accountability of police forces. However, we do not think that it is right to change the arrangements for the MPA and make them separate from those that apply to police authorities across the country. That is why we are resisting the amendments that woulddo that.
New clause 45 has been tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington in the special interests of his mum. I am terribly sorry to have to disappoint his mother. We agree with the intention behind the amendment—so much so that we have already introduced and implemented it as part of the Police and Justice Act 2006. The relevant requirement has already been removed, so that the deputy Mayor does not have to be a member of the MPA—although the Mayor will still be able to include the deputy Mayor in the appointments to the MPA should he so choose. We could certainly put it on record that that aspect of the 2006 Act should be seen with due respect and recognition to the interests of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington, but I apologise that I cannot support the addition of his name to the statute book on this occasion.

Andrew Pelling: Quite clearly, that is going to be a black mark for the parliamentary draftsman working on behalf of the London assembly. Does the Minister think that the assembly may not be aware that that piece of legislation has been introduced, and that that may reflect the problems that occur when this place is such a legislation factory?

Yvette Cooper: I would not wish to cast aspersions on any draftsman working for the GLA. If the GLA wants to make further representations, having looked further at the 2006 Act and at the point, we would be happy to consider them. I considered whether it might be possible to help the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington with his family relationships by accepting the amendment anyway, even though it was unnecessary, but we concluded that that would probably not be the most sensible thing to do. On that basis, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Michael Gove: It is a pleasure to rise to speak on this occasion. Sadly, I have to express my regret at the Minister’s response to the points made by my hon. Friends and by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington. I am disappointed that she has once again been a cause of disappointment to an hon. Member’s mother. Not since the days of Don Giovanni have so many mothers been disappointed by someone who still manages to maintain their poise and smile even as they are breaking hearts.

Andrew Pelling: Did he play for Newcastle?

Michael Gove: Don Giovanni did not form part of the midfield line-up for Newcastle United FC.

Stephen Pound: He plays for Chelsea.

Michael Gove: He is almost certainly going to be the new manager of Chelsea. He certainly stands comparison with Jose Mourinho when it comes to off-the-field athletics. In the same area, I am disappointed also that the hon. Lady, again with a twinkle in her eye, suggested that our position was too flexible. She seemed to suggest that we were playing in two different positions at once; that we were, in ideological terms, adherents to the Dutch theory of total football—simultaneously taking a forward line on granting powers to the Mayor when it suited us and a defensive position when it did not. For the benefit of the House, I shall repeat the philosophical point that has guided both us and, in almost every case, the Liberal Democrats throughout the debate. Wherever possible, we want to see powers being devolved to the Mayor. We have not wanted the powers of the Mayor to be at the expense of the boroughs. And we have wanted to ensure that the Mayor’s extra powers are balanced by an enhanced role for the scrutiny of the assembly. The amendments conform to every one of those tests. There are three tests, rather than the Treasury’s favoured five, but they apply nevertheless. Are powers to be devolved to the Mayor? Absolutely. Is there to be an enhanced scrutiny role for the assembly? Absolutely, because the GLA acquires extra powers that the MPA currently exercises. Will there be any costs to the boroughs? Not at all. In fact, overall Londoners gain through greater accountability.
However, to be fair, I noted that the Minister betrayed more sympathy with the spirit of the amendment than with many of our others. I hope that that suggests that any change in Government policy on the part of Ministers as a result of any change at the top will be more in tune with the principle of greater police accountability. A consistent theme of my party, both when my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) was shadow Home Secretary and subsequently, has been that the police in this country suffer from a confused and tangled system of accountability. We need a clear and more transparent link between public wishes, the priorities that they set, the elected representatives of the public and how the police discharge their functions. The hon. Member for Ealing, North pointed out in his intervention that we already have a more democratic system, but I felt that he uncharacteristically misunderstood my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, Central. The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis at the moment being accountable to a plethora of bodies does not make him more accountable. The confusion of accountability means that the public do not know which levers need to be pulled or which buttons pressed in order to get the commissioner to take account of public opinion.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst pointed out the important example of New York. Mayor Giuliani was conspicuously successful through his appointment of commissioners such as Bill Bratton in bringing down the crime rate. Indeed,the New York experience probably shames the performance of the Metropolitan police by comparison. Clearly, a city that has been Democrat throughout much of its history has now got into the habit of electing Republican mayors, if not Republican Senators or congressional figures, precisely because Republican mayors have been able to deliver policing changes. They have not interfered in the nooks and crannies of policing operations, but they have used their mandate to choose an appropriate commissioner to set an appropriate strategy. Our amendment is the closest that the Government could come effectively to enthusing the policing of London with the Giuliani spirit.
I am sorry that the Minister has not seen fit to accept our amendment today. I hope that there will be an opportunity, perhaps if the Minister rises to become the first female Home Secretary in a future Administration, to ensure that police accountability  and the link between public priorities and the effective discharge of police commissioners’ and chief constables’ roles become closer and more transparent.

Tom Brake: Clearly, at this point, my sensible course of action is not to press for a vote.

Yvette Cooper: I must clarify my earlier remarks. I have just remembered that we have not yet implemented the measures removing the requirement for the Deputy Mayor to be on the MPA. The legislation to do so has been passed, but has not yet commenced. We expect commencement to occur alongside the rest of the provisions in 2008. The current deputy Mayor will not be removed inthe meantime. That would probably account for the different understandings of the Government andthe GLA.

Tom Brake: I thank the Minister.

Andrew Pelling: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the parliamentary draftsmen for the GLA are perhaps more astute than expected?

Tom Brake: That may well be the case. The sensible course of action is not to press for a vote on new clause 45 later in the proceedings, although, presumably, if I did, Government Members would be required to support me, given that the new clause is existing policy. I could therefore present something framed to my mother, which she could hang on her wall. I will not press new clause 45 to a vote.

Bob Neill: Someone has to say something on behalf of my poor mother as well, in all these circumstances—

Stephen Pound: She certainly has our sympathy.

Bob Neill: The feeling is mutual. She has sympathy for me having to endure the good comradeship and amusement of the hon. Gentleman. He is clearly well aware that the first time my mother saw me on television in any political role was when I was leading a delegation looking at reform of the Street Offences Act. Somebody came and told her, “Bob’s on the television talking about prostitutes in Amsterdam.” Against that background, she was pleased to see me take my seat in the House. Next time she comes, I shall point her in the direction of the hon. Member for Ealing, North and she can discuss with him her intimate interest in football, which I am sure will be greatly edifying to both of them.
Having protected my mother’s position, I must say that I am disappointed by the Minister’s response, grateful though my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath was for the tone of her comments. My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, Central and I endeavour to be nimble. I accept that we are not yet at a Carlos Tevez and Yossi Benayoun level of nimbleness, but we are working on it. I see that the hon. Member for Ealing, North blanches at the thought of our rising through diligent training to those two players’ degree of skill.
I appreciate the Minister’s point on diversity. It was well met by the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath, but I am concerned. She went into some detail, for which I am grateful, about the attempt to mirror the situation elsewhere in the country, but we pressed the matter to a Division because we argue that the whole point of devolution is that it is not necessary to mirror national templates in a devolved situation. Undue weight has perhaps been given to that desire in the Government’s decision to oppose the amendments. We have sought to tailor make a different situation for London because London’s needs are different.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, Central for referring to the democratic deficit in policing, not just at the strategic level but in how safer neighbourhood panels operate. I hope that the Minister will take those comments on board and speak to her friends in the Home Office. It seems strange that local ward councillors should be prohibited from involvement in safer neighbourhood teams in their areas. All of us in London want neighbourhood policing to work, but it will work better with a closer collaboration between the safer neighbourhood teams and panels and local ward councillors. I hope that that message can be taken back constructively from this discussion.
I note the comments about the boroughs’ involvement, and I hope that that can be developed. One reason why we thought it useful for the assembly to be the scrutiny body is that, although it would not go as far as new clause 9 and put borough representatives on the police authority as in the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority model, every borough would have a directly elected constituency representative in the London assembly, so there would be a direct borough-constituency link. We think that that is a virtue of our system.
When I visited New York with cross-party assembly colleagues and looked at the working of the New York city council police committee, it was interesting that it had the ability to scrutinise in considerable detail without going into operational matters, drilling down to performance at precinct level, which I suppose is the equivalent of our borough operational command unit. The committee did so intensely and effectively. Perhaps that is a lesson for us to take on board. With those comments of disappointment, we will press our amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 54

Short title, citation, commencement and extent

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Andrew Pelling: As the Bill will become law under the clause, I want to take this opportunity, at the invitation of the Minister during discussions on clause 17, when we were considering the ease of disposal of land by Transport for London, to ask what ease of disposal will be provided to the London Development Agency post-Olympics. The provision that has been given to TFL would be well provided to the LDA, in terms of disposing of land with a much-increased value after the Olympics. I am grateful to the Minister for his invitation to raise this point.

Jim Fitzpatrick: Clause 54 sets out the short title of the Bill and provides for it, when enacted, and the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to be
“cited together as the Greater London Authority Acts 1999 and 2007.”
The clause determines the extent of the Bill, which does not extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland. It also sets out the date on which the Bill’s provisions come into force. Forgive me, but I cannot identify how the hon. Gentleman’s point is relevant to the clause or the clause stand part debate.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 54 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 1

Congestion charging
‘In Schedule 23 to the GLA Act 1999 (road user charging) after paragraph 4 insert—
“(4A) In the event that no inquiry is held by virtue of paragraph 4(3)(b) above, the Authority shall publish—
(a) the responses to any consultation carried out under paragraph 4(3)(a),
(b) an analysis of the responses, and
(c) in the case of responses which it proposes to disregard in whole or in part its reason for so doing.”.’.—[Tom Brake.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Tom Brake: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause brings us back to transport and, more specifically, congestion charging. The purpose of the new clause, which I am pleased to say is supported by both Opposition parties, is to ensure that, if an extension to the congestion charging zone takes place without an inquiry, the authority must publish consultation responses, the analysis of those responses and any reasons why representations that have been received have been disregarded.
The new clause is straightforward. It is about openness, transparency and providing additional checks and balances. Although it would not stop the Mayor proceeding with such an extension, it would make clear the reasons why he had rejected certain representations. It would also make clearer the opposition to his proposals, as in the case of the most recent extension, and provide much more public awareness of it. The Mayor has been frank in revealing some of the facts behind the extension and the support that was received—or, indeed, not received. He is on record as saying that only a quarter of the public responses to the consultation supported the proposal. He also referred to what he described to as
“a representative London wide survey”,
but even that found that opposition outweighed support, with 41 per cent. supporting his proposals and 43 per cent. objecting to them.
Requiring the Mayor to make publicly available the analysis, the responses and the reasons why such a high level of opposition was set aside would act as another significant check and balance, which really is required when we are talking about giving the Mayor additional powers. It is therefore entirely appropriate to introduce additional checks and balances to ensure that his powers are exercised sensibly.
It is also worth pointing out that the proposed extension is unlikely to address one particular concern, which flies in the face of an earlier debate on the climate change strategy. Our view is that the extension, the 90 per cent. discount for residents in the area of the extension and saying that they must pay for a week and nothing less will encourage people to drive into central London more than they would otherwise do. One consequence of the proposal would be to work against what the Mayor is trying to do on the climate change strategy.
The purpose of the new clause is simple, straightforward and clear. It would make publicly available much more information about consultation and the Mayor’s reasons for rejecting an overwhelming response against his proposals.

Greg Hands: I shall be brief, because the number of speeches that I have made against the congestion charge extension in recent years probably runs into double, if not triple figures. I shall speak briefly about the experience of some of us in west London on consultation, on both the original zone and the extension. The consultation strategy is at the heart of the amendment, and no one doubts the power of the Mayor, of whatever party, to introduce a congestion charging scheme. It was specifically referred to in the 1999 Act.
There is a clear need to reform the way in which consultation is undertaken. At the moment, there is a statutory duty to consult, but there is absolutely no duty to listen, to have regard to, or even to read the submissions to the Mayor. There is not even an obligation to open or count the letters or e-mails that come flooding in. It gives politics a bad name when people are asked for their views and no regard is paid, or seen to be paid, to those views. If we are to have a system of directly elected mayors—there is a lot of merit in that—we must have a system whereby the  mayor is accountable, and if he or she undertakes a consultation strategy, there should be an obligation on him or her to note the results.
People say that the directly-elected-mayor model leads to better and quicker decisions, but a corollary is the long consultation process. Ironically, even those who believe in extending the congestion charge, or are in the original congestion charging zone, would take issue with the length of time that it has taken between the first proposal and its implementation. The current system gives rise to poor and slow government. The proposal for a congestion charge extension was first made in 2003 and will be implemented next month. The consultation was overwhelmingly opposed to the proposal, but the Mayor decided, none the less, to go ahead. There was always a suspicion that he would go ahead with the scheme regardless of the consultation.

Martin Linton: Between 2003, when it was mooted, and 2007, when it will be introduced, there was a GLA and mayoral election, and the Mayor gained a majority. People voted in the knowledge that he had proposed an extension. Does that not take precedence over the results of consultation?

Greg Hands: That begs the question, why have consultation? If the only consultation that matters to the hon. Gentleman is that at the ballot box, surely that negates the need for any consultation.

Jim Fitzpatrick: Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that as a result of the consultation amendments were made to the original scheme?

Greg Hands: The Minister for London is right, amendments were made. For example, Chelsea Harbour is now included in the residents’ discount area after representations that I made. There were other small changes to the boundaries and, I believe, to the hours of operation. There have not been any significant changes to the original scheme or to the extension.

Karen Buck: I also made a number of representations, and the westward extension is not the design that I put to the Mayor or would have preferred, but during the consultation we won a series of significant concessions on the northern boundary. It would be unfair of the hon. Gentleman to claim that there were no such concessions.
It is also worth mentioning that part of the dilemma that we discussed when considering planning decisions was that the western extension and the whole congestion zone were developed for a wider strategic purpose for the benefit of Londoners. The local consultation therefore has to be weighed up against the interests of London as a whole.

Greg Hands: Of course that is true, but if we were starting from scratch we would not design a system whereby it took four years to introduce such a scheme. I am trying to put myself in the position of those who are in favour of the westward extension. I would be rather miffed to discover that it was first mootedin 2003 and not enacted until 2007 because of consultation that was ultimately not listened to anyway.

Andrew Slaughter: I am not quite following the argument. If the hon. Gentleman is right and the Mayor does not listen to or read consultations—I am not sure how we could oblige him to read them—and takes no notice, surely the longer he takes the better.
I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman is representing the interests of Michael Caine and the other residents of Chelsea Harbour. I think we all have issues. Like the hon. Gentleman, I oppose the western extension. There were substantial concessions—for instance, in the Eynham road area of my constituency—but significantly not for the Edward Woods estate, an important area of my constituency that is now in the zone against the wishes of the residents. Having said that, whether or not we agree about particular parts of the zone, surely the main consideration is that, as my hon. Friend the Minister said, changes have been made.

Greg Hands: That is a rather curious intervention. The hon. Gentleman seems to be saying that changes have been made, but he also described how he failed to get the changes that he wanted. However, that brings me conveniently to the position that Hammersmith and Fulham council took during the consultation.

Karen Buck: Before the hon. Gentleman moves on to that point, he is asking for the consultation process to bear a heavier burden than it should. One of the key reasons for the length of time that elapsed between the initial proposal of the westward extension and its introduction was the introduction of public transport alternatives, particularly further improvements in the bus service and road management schemes. That means that the congestion charge will not result in people being displaced and having no alternative way to make their journeys.

Greg Hands: I thank the hon. Lady for making that point. She mentions public transport improvements that should have been made and I am all ears to hear what they are. A package of bus route changes was proposed as part of the westward extension of the zone and is coming into force about now. For my constituents, the impact has been minimal. There is overcrowding on the Wimbledon branch of the District line before the zone comes into effect in the morning. It is at 95 per cent. capacity during rush hour, so it is difficult to see how things could be improved. If there is to be a system in which the Mayor consults, he must be obliged to pay regard to the results. Otherwise there is no point in having the consultation in the first place.
To return to the point about the previously Labour-controlled Hammersmith and Fulham council, the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush says that he is opposed to the westward extension of the zone. I find that curious, given the content of an article that I have here, which appeared in what was then called the Hammersmith and Fulham Magazine on 8 April 2004. That was 15 days before the consultation deadline of 23 April, at the height of the fever surrounding the consultation.
One would have expected the council to defend its residents, who had the almost unanimous view that the westward extension would be a poor thing. In the article, it said:
“The council will be guided primarily by the views of residents on the merits of extending the zone...There have undoubtedly been some benefits of the existing zone and there may be some in extending it. However, they appear marginal and it may well be that the disruption caused by the extension outweighs any benefit.”
That is hardly a robust position opposing the westward extension. That was a dereliction of the council’s duty and also, I believe, a key factor in its defeat last year.
We need a system with consultation—we must back there being consultation behind congestion charging—but there must also be a mechanism for the swift appraisal of the consultation before decisions are made.

Michael Gove: It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington, both of whom made effective and cogent cases for the new clause. I am also grateful to the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush for telling us that Michael Caine lives in Chelsea Harbour. As the great actor himself might say, “Not a lot of people know that.”
The mention of Michael Caine highlights a material issue of the westward extension of the congestion charge. Some of us consider the introduction of the congestion charge to have been a good thing on the whole and see some merit in similar schemes being employed elsewhere in the UK. However, we have a few questions about the extension, particularly in relation to the Mayor, the wisdom of his policy and the integrity of the consultation.
When the congestion charge is extended westward, a variety of wealthy people who live in Kensington and Chelsea, such as Michael Caine, will be able to drive into London at a discounted rate compared with what they would have paid hitherto. Yet some shops and businesses in the extended zone, particularly the smaller, independent ones, might be denied the custom from places such as Hammersmith, Fulham and Brentford that they relied on when they were outside the zone. So, the measure simultaneously helps rich drivers and penalises independent shopkeepers.
As we all know, tomorrow we debate the Sustainable Communities Bill, part of which tends towards supporting independent shops. I know that Government Front Benchers are under instructions not to support the Bill, but there is a lot of support for it among Labour Back Benchers. I therefore suspect that there is widespread unease on those Back Benches about the westward extension of the congestion charge, as well as a desire for communities to be more effectively represented through the new clause. I suspect that the hon. Member for Regent’s Park and Kensington, North is about to rise to offer some words of support.

Karen Buck: I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman will be slightly disappointed. We must be careful about asking the congestion charge to bear a heavier burden than it should in protecting businesses, given that Westminster city council raises half as much as the entire London congestion zone through its parking policy alone. In Westminster Hall, a debate on parking is going on as we speak.
If we are going to talk about protecting small businesses and other community interests, which is an important debate, those issues cannot be seen out of context. A number of issues, not least of which is the cost of parking, are at least as responsible for the pressures on businesses as the congestion charge.

Michael Gove: I take the hon. Lady’s point. Both Kensington and Chelsea council and Westminster city council have parking policies that impose higher charges closer to the centre of town and lower charges where there is less demand on services, so there is an element of gradation and flexibility there. That shows that those administrations are conscious of the need to balance revenue, traffic flow and the commercial interests of businesses in their areas.
More broadly, all sorts of vehicles, including many of the commercial vehicles that supply independent retailers and others, will be liable to the congestion charge, whereas they might not be liable to parking charges, because of how commercial and customer traffic flows vary.

Stephen Pound: There is a borough slightly beyond Hammersmith and Fulham, which is the borough of Ealing, where we have considered such matters in great detail. Normally, the hon. Gentleman brings a utilitarian analysis to such matters. I admire him for that, because it is practical, but he says that there has been a negative impact on commercial activity in the city. However, Oxford street has just enjoyed its best ever year for sales.
I see no vast, echoing commercial canyons of empty shop fronts, with tumbleweed rolling through the streets. On the contrary, small shopkeepers who have gone out of business tend to say that that happened because of either parking restrictions or commercial rents or business rates. [Interruption.] Does the hon. Gentleman at least accept that the congestion charge is not the root of all evil in the world of London commerce?

Michael Gove: We were greeted by the tintinnabulation of bells there, although I do not think that they were tolling the death of London commerce.
I entirely take the hon. Gentleman’s point. My point about the westward extension of the congestion charge is that part of the cherishable nature of parts of Kensington and Chelsea and of Westminster relates to the fact that they contain urban villages and shopping centres with a variety of independent retailers. Part of the quality of the shopping experience that the King’s road and the Fulham road offer to residents and tourists depends on the variety of independent outlets. There is a risk of reaching a tipping point, at which the westward extension, added to various other factors, some of which he mentioned, will place such shops under much greater pressure.
I take the hon. Gentleman’s point about central London flourishing. However, there is also an area of conspicuous commercial success in Marylebone, which is just a stone’s throw from Oxford street. One reason for that success is the enlightened approach of the Howard de Walden estate to the mix of shops in that area. That underlines the point that there is suppressed demand for independent retailers. When we consider legislation, and when the Mayor considers the congestion charge, it is important to ensure that that spread of independence is not snuffed out by heavy-handed regulation.

Martin Linton: I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman about the diversity of independent shopkeepers, which is an issue in my constituency, too. We only wish we had the same situation as Marylebone high street, where a single owner owns all the shops and can make decisions as an enlightened shop owner.
However, surely there is a big flaw in the hon. Gentleman’s argument that the congestion charge will have a detrimental effect on retail businesses in general. There are boroughs outside Hammersmith and Fulham, and Kensington and Chelsea, in all directions, and for every shop in the King’s road that will lose business there will be another, on my side of the bridge, that will gain, because it is outside the congestion charge zone. It will be up to enlightened retailers and supermarkets to move their shops outside the congestion zone. If that is what will get them more business, they will find it in their interests to do so.

Michael Gove: I accept the logic of the hon. Gentleman’s point. There can always be displacement activity, but my overall point is that I would not want regulations to harm independent retailers who operate in already successful shopping environments.

Karen Buck: I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way once more. I suspect that we might be straining your patience, Lady Winterton, in flexing this debate, but it is also worth asking the hon. Gentleman whether he agrees with the extensive research that shows that the average spend per shopper who arrives by public transport is significantly higher than the average spend of people who arrive by car.

Michael Gove: I am very interested by that statistic, as I was not familiar with it. Some shoppers who arrive by car in central London might be hassled dads with children in tow—as I sometimes am—whose ability to spend freely might be somewhat constrained, and not only by their Aberdonian backgrounds. People arriving by public transport might be coming off the Heathrow express, fresh from having spent the weekend in Monaco or some other spot where Labour party funders are inclined to hang out—there might be explanations for that, but I shall not stray down that path.
By placing an obligation on the Mayor to provide his reasons for rejecting evidence given during consultation and enjoining on him the duty to publish all those representations, the new clause will make the decision-making process more transparent. I know that we might have strained your patience, Lady Winterton, by straying on to the question of independent shops in west and central London, but it is of great importance to Londoners and precisely the sort of issue that would have been ventilated if all the representations had been received and the Mayor had had to take on, as has the Committee, all the arguments relating to that vital factor in making London attractive.
In a way, the debate that we have had in the last10 minutes underlines the importance of openness to different points of view when constructing a mechanism, such as the westward extension of the congestion charge, that might have an effect on business.

Michael Fabricant: My hon. Friend makes his point well, but the matter concerns not just independent shops. The John Lewis Partnership, which of course has a major department store on Oxford street, felt that its representations to the Mayor against the congestion charge were not dealt with adequately. So my hon. Friend is absolutely right to talk about the importance of transparency.

Michael Gove: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that point. I was talking mainly about smaller shops, but the John Lewis Partnership’s admirable co-operative venture has a voice in the retail and business sectors that we would do well to pay attention to. The new clause would ensure that the Mayor pays appropriate heed to its voice, that the public are aware of the arguments put and that we have an opportunity to find out why he rejects certain evidence. That process would be made transparent and taken into the public sphere, and as a result we would have better decision making.
Throughout the Committee we have made the point that greater scrutiny of, and openness in, the exercise of the Mayor’s powers could only be welcomed by an enlightened Mayor confident in his or her policies. They would of course have the freedom to push ahead with a westward, northward or southward extension of the congestion charge, as they felt appropriate. However, they would have to engage with the arguments of those most intimately affected.
I have one final point to make, which is almost a declaration of interest that I should have made at the beginning. The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington pointed out that as a consequence of the westward extension some people might make a journey that they otherwise would not have. The extension is not yet in force, but a person living in the area covered can apply for a discount that is now in operation. I mentioned my mother earlier, but my wife made an early application for an exemption from the congestion charge—she is a much more prudent guardian of the Gove household finances than I am—because we live in the area covered. In fact, when we are in London, during the weeks, and not in the balmy acres of—

Hon. Members: Surrey!

Michael Gove: I was pausing because I was not sure whether to say acres or hectares.
When not in the balmy acres of Surrey, we are in the attractive purviews of Regent’s Park and Kensington, North. Because my wife made that application, this morning I drove the family car into the precincts ofthe Palace of Westminster—not a journey that I would ordinarily have undertaken. That underlines the importance of the point made by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington: the westward extension might not achieve all the Mayor’s environmental objectives and his arguments would be more rigorously tested were this new clause adopted.

Jim Fitzpatrick: Having been graciously taken by surprise by the hon. Member for Croydon, Central, in my first contribution I omitted to add my welcome to your return to the Chair, Lady Winterton. I do so now.
The Government agree that it is right to consult before introducing or amending a road-user charging scheme. Under the Greater London Authority Act 1999, it is for the Mayor to decide on the consultation for the making or amending of the road-user charging scheme. The 1999 Act gives the Mayor the power, but not the duty to consult on a road-user charging scheme. It is also for the Mayor to consider whether to proceed with proposals for road-user charging schemes following such a consultation. That decision must be taken in the best interests of London. Such an assessment requires consideration of the complex nature of transport issues across London and the impact on other areas such as tourism, and business, as well as transport users. The Mayor is uniquely placed to do that. Clearly, the Mayor must be allowed to respond to those consultations as necessary. The Mayor received nearly 50,000 responses to the consultation on the westward extension. It would surely have been impractical to respond to all the points raised and not taken forward as suggested by this new clause. On that point of practicality and with that in mind, I hope that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington will withdraw his amendment.

Tom Brake: I have listened carefully to the Minister. In theory, I am sure that on these Benches we would not want to be prescriptive in setting out how the Mayor should conduct his consultation, what publicity he should give to it, how he should make publicly available the information about representations he received, and why he rejected them. Indeed, we had a debate earlier today about how we wanted to be flexible in giving the Mayor scope to develop his own strategy in relation to climate change. The difference here is that the Mayor has a track record of disregarding the responses to consultation. Therefore, in spite of the Minister’s warm words—
 Stephen Pound rose—

Tom Brake: After I have given way, I will make a decision about how to proceed.

Stephen Pound: I am not entirely sure that I can persuade the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment. He seems to be talking about a clever side to a referendum. The clause that he is moving requires three specific duties mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). Which of those three duties are not currently implemented by the Mayor? To my knowledge, when the original congestion charging zone was implemented and the extension was consulted upon, each one of those three duties was carried out and was there for all to see.

Tom Brake: I shall look for support from behind me from members of the assembly who have watched the Mayor’s consultation in action and his failure to observe the responses.
 Several hon. Members rose—

Tom Brake: I am about to receive other helpful interventions.

Andrew Pelling: I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. The response of the Mayor has been to say, “Well, I got elected so I don’t care what the consultation is”. Surely, that does not provide a sufficiently good quality response to the residents of London.

Tom Brake: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. If our amendment was passed, the Mayor would be required to go into print time and time again as saying, “I don’t care. I am the Mayor and whatever the response is to the consultation I will proceed none the less”. One would hope that that would embarrass him to the extent that he may reconsider his position. I was about to conclude by stating that the Minster had done a good job of presenting the best case possible in relation to the Government’s position on this new clause. However, I am afraid that he did not do enough to convince me and the official Opposition that we should withdraw so we will press the matter to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 2

Consultation
‘(1) Section 32 (consultation) of the GLA Act 1999 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) The Mayor shall notify the Chair of the Assembly of every consultation to be undertaken under subsection (1) before its commencement.”
(3) After subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) The Authority shall, after undertaking any consultation under section 32(1) and before implementing any proposal, publish a statement identifying which of the responses to its consultation are accepted in whole or in part for implementation, indicating the reasons why any responses so submitted are not accepted or not accepted in full.”.’.—[Tom Brake.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Tom Brake: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Ann Winterton: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 34—Consultation strategy—
‘After section 42A of the GLA Act 1999 insert—
“42B Consultation strategy
The Mayor shall produce and publish a consultation strategy containing information about the procedures in respect of all matters upon which he is required to consult under this Act including—
(a) procedure for consultation,
(b) persons or bodies to be consulted,
(c) arrangements for publicity,
(d) arrangements for provision of copies of any strategy and amendments thereto,
(e) arrangements for conducting public participation in respect of new strategies or amendment thereto,
(f) arrangements to permit reasonable timetable for consultation,
(g) arrangements in respect of responses to consultation including provision of written statements.”.’.

Tom Brake: In the interests of enabling the Minister to catch a plane later this afternoon, I will make only a brief contribution given that the debate on this new clause would sound similar to the debate that we have just had on new clause 1. New clause 2 is also about ensuring that the Mayor carries out the maximum consultation. It would require him to notify the assembly of every consultation, publish the responses and identify those he had accepted and those he had not accepted, before proceeding with implementation of whatever proposal he was putting to the electorate or the local population.
New clause 2 requires no further elaboration other than to say that it is again about strengthening consultation, making the process more open and transparent and making sure that the Mayor’s views and the views of those he is consulting are on the record so that a more informed and more consensual decision is taken at the end of the day.

Michael Gove: I may be at risk of testing both your patience, Lady Winterton, which I know is almost infinite, and that of the Committee by pointing out that I am about to echo the hon. Gentleman’s echo of his previous comments. Essentially the debate on consultation has been at its most acute when it comes to the Mayor’s exercise of powers over the congestion charge and, in particular, its westward extension. New clause 34 would provide an alternative, not competing but complementary method of defining the Mayor’s consultation powers alongside new clause 2. We have sought to lay out a way in which the Mayor can choose and it is at the Mayor’s discretion how he defines the manner in which he will consult Londoners and appropriate bodies.
One of the reason for tabling the new clause and hoping that the Minister might accept it today is that rather than the Mayor having to develop an ad hoc series of consultations at different points, we have provided him with a means of laying down the method by which he will conduct all the consultations that will govern his policy. It is an important principle that those who exercise executive power in the United Kingdom prefer, wherever possible, to be bound by the rule of law. I mentioned earlier that one of the things that we seek to do is to ensure that when the Mayor does exercise his powers, he does so in such a way that all those who are affected by them have as much confidence as possible that he is exercising them appropriately.

Tom Brake: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that if the new clause were adopted and the Mayor followed that procedure it would provide him with a great deal of protection because he could point to an agreed process? He could demonstrate that he had followed it and had been very open in the way that he addressed the consultation.

Michael Gove: I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making that point. It is the second point that I was about to make, and an important one too. There will be times when the Mayor will be of a different party or come from a different tradition from the Government in power in Westminster. It will inevitably strengthen the Mayor’s hand if, as well as a democratic mandate, he has the capacity to show that he has followed a rigorous consultation procedurethat has been laid down to cover all consultations, not just the particular policy that he is putting forward, and that that consultation procedure has yielded support for what he seeks to do.
We are giving the Mayor another weapon to defend or advance the interests of Londoners against a Government who might be determined to thwart them. Far from constraining the Mayor’s hand, what we are doing—as all enlightened legislators should—is fashioning an appropriate way in which to provide him with an opportunity to meet Londoner’s needs and to challenge the Government to accept his role as London’s champion.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I am sorry, but I have to disappoint the hon. Gentleman once again. Let me begin by repeating the fact that the Government strongly believe in the importance of all public bodies engaging in consultation with the stakeholders on the development and implementation of strategies and policies. Consultation is an invaluable part of policy development, often leading in the end to better strategies and policies. That is why the GLA Act already requires the Mayor to consult the assembly, London boroughs and others on, among other things, the preparation of his statutory strategies under section 42 and on the use of the GLA’s general powers under section 32.
 As we discussed, clause 2 requires the Mayor to have explicit regard to any comments from the assembly and the functional bodies at an early stage in the preparation of his strategies, but we do not support the new clauses. New clause 2 would require the Mayor to notify the assembly of consultation under section 32 of the 1999 Act on the use of the authority’s general power before that consultation begins. It also requires him to publish a written statement before implementing any proposal identifying which responses to consultation he accepts and giving reasons when he does not.
I am sure that the Mayor carefully considers all responses to consultation before deciding whether to implement a proposal, so I cannot see any compelling reason to accept the new clause. The Mayor is not required to produce a written statement discussing all the responses to other key statutory consultations, such as those on draft strategies and the annual draft consolidated budgets. Indeed, if he were, it would add significantly to the GLA’s bureaucratic burden.
New clause 34 would require the Mayor to prepare a strategy setting out his procedures for consultation. Again, however, I am unconvinced of the need to prescribe such an approach in primary legislation. Such a requirement would be bureaucratically burdensome and potentially costly to prepare. It is not clear that the resultant strategy would be of significant value.
Furthermore, given that everyone wants less statutory prescription on how local authorities should conduct their affairs, I see no compelling reason why we should require the Mayor to prepare a further formal strategy on how he will consult. It should be for him to decide whether or not it would be sensible to prepare such a strategy, not for Parliament to impose it. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.

Tom Brake: Given the result of the previous Division on a similar subject, I can confidently predict that the outcome on the new clause will be the same. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 3

Term of office (Mayor)
‘In section 21 of the GLA Act 1999 (disqualification from being the Mayor or an Assembly member) after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) A person is disqualified from being elected or being the Mayor if he has previously twice been elected to that office”.’.—[Tom Brake.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Tom Brake: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Ann Winterton: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 14—Vacation of office by Mayor following petition and recall ballot
‘After section 16 of the GLA Act 1999 insert—
“16A Vacation of office following petition and recall ballot
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for, or in connection with, requiring the Mayor on receipt of a petition which complies with the provisions of the regulations and a recall ballot of eligible voters in London to vacate office, in such circumstances as may be prescribed in the regulations.
(2) The provision which may be made by regulations under subsection (1) includes provision—
(a) as to the form and content of petitions (including provisions for petitions in electronic form),
(b) as to the minimum number of electors entitled to vote for the Mayor under this Act who must support any petition presented to the Mayor during any period specified in the regulations,
(c) for or in connection with requiring an office of the GLA to publish the number of electors who must support any petition presented to the authority,
(d) as to the way in which electors are to support a petition (including provision enabling electors to support petitions by telephone or by electronic means),
(e) as to the action which may, may not or must be taken by the Authority in connection with any petition,
(f) as to the manner in which a petition is to be presented,
(g) as to the verification of any petition,
(h) as to the minimum and maximum number of days in which a ballot should be held,
(i) as to the format and wording of the recall ballot,
(j) as to the date on which, or the time by which, the Mayor must vacate office,
(k) for or in connection with enabling the Secretary of State, in the event of any failure by the Authority to take any action permitted or required by virtue of the regulations, to take that action.
(3) The number of electors mentioned in subsection (2)(b) is to be calculated at such times as may be provided by regulations under this section and (unless such regulations otherwise provide) is to be 10 per cent. of the total number of electors participating in the Mayoral election preceding the date of any petition.
(4) Nothing in subsection (2) or (3) affects the generality of the power under subsection (1).”.’.

Tom Brake: The purpose of new clause 3 is to ensure that a Mayor can serve only two terms in office. I accept that there are arguments both for and against fixed two-term periods. I understand the argument that applies to the US President that, in the second term, he becomes a lame duck. However, I believe to a great extent that that is down to the individual and the extent to which that person wants to pursue with vigour the full two terms.

Greg Hands: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman gave the example of the United States President. I have an interesting parallel. One of the reasons why I am opposed to the new clause is that, when the constitution of the United States was amended to introduce term limits for the post of President, it was after the person in question, Franklin Roosevelt, had departed from office. One of the problems with the argument about term limits is that if an incumbent had already done more than two terms, the debate would inevitably be about that incumbent rather than the merits of the constitutional change. The hon. Gentleman’s new clause would actually disfranchise the electorate; they would not be able to vote out of office the current incumbent, which I am very much looking forward to happening in 2008.

Tom Brake: The hon. Gentleman refers to amendment 22 to the United States constitution, which introduced the limit of two terms.

Andrew Slaughter: I had hoped to agree with the entire intervention from the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham; I agreed with it up to the final part. The problem with the new clause is that it is partisan: it is based on the Mayor proving rather too popular for the likes of Opposition parties, and it is aimed at him. Were I to table an amendment that disqualified anyone, say, convicted of a dishonesty offence, it might prejudice certain prospective Conservative candidates. Similarly, were I to table an amendment disqualifying anybody who had simultaneously held opposing positions on important issues, it might disadvantage a Liberal Democrat candidate. The weakness of the hon. Gentleman’s amendment is not constitutional but personal.

Tom Brake: I do not seek to be partisan. There is a case for introducing the two-term limit in the future.

Greg Hands: That is not what the new clause says.

Tom Brake: We have a Mayor who could serve the remainder of his office and not enter into a third term. I regret that my new clause appears partisan. The Mayor is midway through his second term, but the principle is strong and valid and it should be introduced. The US took that decision. President Thomas Jefferson said that if there were no termination in the constitution to the services of the chief magistrate, as he described the post, the office would be for life. I hope that we all agree that no one, whether Mayor of London or Prime Minister, should be in post for life.

Greg Hands: I am interested in this subject. Is it Liberal Democrat policy to seek term limits on political positions generally? If not, why should it apply only to the Mayor of London and not to other positions?

Tom Brake: I risk stepping on many other toes if I apply the principle to all positions of executive power. We are discussing the London model—a system of governance that Members accept is unique in the United Kingdom. I do not seek to extend the principle to all and sundry.

Martin Linton: As the hon. Gentleman was gracious enough to say that the new clause is not moved in any partisan sense, and that it would apply particularly to London, I am sure that there is time between now and Tuesday for him to table an amendment to the new clause—or table a new new clause—that would exempt the incumbent in London from that provision, in the same way that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was exempted. The current Mayor could stand in 2008, and in 2012 just before the Olympics, and after his four terms the next Mayor could be restricted to two terms.

Tom Brake: That is possibly a way out for me, which at this moment in time may be something I seek. I shall consider the hon. Gentleman’s idea. In the unlikely event that the Minister were willing to entertain the new clause, subject to certain amendments, I should be tempted to put forward the hon. Gentleman’s helpful proposals.
There are arguments against two fixed terms, and against creating the perception that someone who is midway through their second term is ineffective and no longer able to make strong proposals. Equally, there are similar concerns about having no fixed terms and no defined point at which office is relinquished. There are both pros and cons. However, on balance, I should like to put forward in a non-partisan way the idea of two fixed terms for the Mayor of London, given the executive power and strength of that office. Once the Government have accepted the proposal, I shall entertain the option of pushing the time frame back so that the measure can be clearly perceived as non-partisan.

Greg Hands: If the proposal should apply to an executive Mayor in the London model, should it also apply in Watford, which also has an executive mayor?

Tom Brake: We did a certain amount of research before putting forward the proposal. It was pointed out that Watford might be deployed as an argument; that is why I have been keen to restrict the proposal simply to London, which has a unique structure and where the Mayor has unique power that is not replicated in any other city in the country. It will probably be sensible for me not to pursue this matter with much more vigour or for much longer. I shall give the Minister and the official Opposition the opportunity to support the proposal.

Michael Gove: The hon. Gentleman advanced on to the battlefield with a flourish, but I am afraid that once he came under enfilade fire—both from my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Fulham and the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush—he presented, much to my regret, a bedraggled figure.

Tom Brake: Not my finest hour.

Michael Gove: It seemed that the hon. Gentleman was conducting a fighting tactical retreat. He is self-critical enough to say that it was not his finest hour. I thought that he put up a good fight for a proposition that I must concede is flawed.
The arguments of those who intervened underlined that. Given the big personality who occupies the mayoral office, any attempt to call for term limits will inevitably be seen as an attempt to clip Ken’s wings rather than ensure that the principle applies impartially to the mayoral office. More than that, we have to accept that the whole principle of term limits is alien to the British constitution. We all know why it emerged in America and that the original principle of citizen legislator, which existed in the Roman Republic—where there were strict term limits of one year or six months, after which the same office could not be held by the same individual—was a safeguard against the arrogant exercise of executive power.
However, for all its glories, the Roman Republic was not a fully participatory, representative democratic system such as the one that we enjoy in this country. We have evolved a constitution that is allergic to term limits, and for a very good reason. We know the answer to arrogance. It is the voice of the people at the ballot box throwing out a Prime Minister who has overstayed his welcome—
 Stephen Pound rose—

Michael Gove: Talking of which, I am happy to give way to the hon. Member for Ealing, North.

Stephen Pound: It is unfortunate that we proud Londoners, born and bred, have to listen to so many examples from across the Atlantic. However, if we are to look at America, that new found land, I should like to ask the hon. Gentleman whether he has thought, as I have, that the only figure comparable to our present Mayor of London was Fiorello LaGuardia. People started to talk about term limits only during LaGuardia’s third term. Is not all this talk much more to do with the individual concerned, rather than the position of Mayor?

Michael Gove: The hon. Gentleman makes a particularly valid point. To be fair, the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington was absolutely clear that the intention behind the new clause, certainly as he presented it, was not to make a point against Mayor Livingstone. It may well be that some of his Liberal Democrat allies who pressed the new clause on him were handing him a poisoned chalice. It may be that some of those who wanted him to press the new clause were actuated by lower motives and wanted to put Mayor Livingstone in the frame. All I can say is that the hon. Gentleman showed in his speech even as he pressed his case that he was free of malice. We on our side of the Committee wish no ill will towards the current incumbent of the office. We want to see him taken out of office at the ballot box by a fair election in which an alternative candidate—a plethora are willing to stand under the Conservative banner—has the opportunity to eject him from office.

Andrew Slaughter: The hon. Gentleman is clearly privy to the inner secrets of the Conservative party. Will it put forward a candidate at the next elections?

Michael Gove: I am flattered by the hon. Gentleman’s insinuation that I am privy to the inner secrets of the Conservative party. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am not privy to any of the secrets of the Conservative party, but I know that a large number of remarkably talented candidates, some of whom have not been partisan Conservatives, will relish the opportunity to take part in our open and democratic primary process and to challenge the Mayor on his record. It has been instructive thatthe longer the leadership of my right hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) has gone on, the broader the appeal of the Conservative party has been, the more we have risen in the polls relative to the Government and the greater the number of individuals who have expressed an interest has been. In that respect, the leader of the party was wise to allow the process to become longer. It will give Londoners a bigger choice of more talented figures.
If any Labour Members would like to take advantage of our voting procedure, they can do so. One of the important things is that we will have a truly open primary. One of the key elements that is attractive about how we will select our mayoral candidate is that it will be open to all Londoners to vote. It is a striking feature, Lady Winterton, of open primaries that the two Conservative candidates who were selected atthe last general election by open primaries—our candidates in Warrington, South in the fair county of Cheshire and in Reading, East—both received swings above the national average. The open primary method of selection, which Labour has mocked, saw the membership of both constituency parties rise along with the votes. It might be the case that the scorn directed towards the open primary system will turn to bitter tears of lamentation when a Conservative takes over as Mayor after the next election.

Greg Hands: May I make my hon. Friend aware that the Hammersmith Conservative association will also chose its candidate for the next general election by open primary to take on an interloper, the Labour candidate who is currently the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush?

Michael Gove: If one looks at the projected majority in the Labour seat of Hammersmith, one will see that it stands at something like 5,000. However, if one considers the election results for Hammersmith and Fulham borough council and prays in aid the evidence of a differential swing in favour of a candidate selected by an open primary, whoever might be the Labour candidate in Hammersmith has a jacket on a much shooglier nail than he assumes. In other words, his seat is considerably less safe than would have been assumed otherwise. Once again, the power of the open primary and the ballot box to affect who represents us is underwritten.

Andrew Slaughter: I fear that the hon. Gentleman is trying to spook me. I am wary of him because he tried to entrap me earlier this afternoon by luring me out of my temporary Trappism as a stand-in Parliamentary Private Secretary by way of showing that I was unfit for that office. Now, apparently, I am unfit also to be the candidate in Hammersmith. I would say that I do not need any assistance from the Conservative party in reducing majorities, and I pray in aid my attempt in Uxbridge.

Michael Gove: That was a gracious intervention, proof if proof were needed—and none is—that the hon. Gentleman has a sense of humour as well as a sense of proportion. He might need his sense of humour and of proportion when the Conservatives win Hammersmith at the next general election, but I am glad to place it on the record that when I made reference to his temporary occupation of the seat occupied by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough I in no way suggested that he was unfit for office. He is perfectly equipped to serve in almost any capacity in this Administration. [Laughter.] He can take that how he will.
I hope that I made it clear that we do not believe in term limits in principle or for the Mayor of London. We believe that this Mayor should receive his just desserts at the ballot box and at the hands of London’s voters.
I shall briefly explain why we are pressing new clause 14. We have talked a little about why term limits are an American invention that is inappropriate for the British constitution, but we believe that the principle of a recall vote is one American invention that might be appropriate for it. One reason why we think it is appropriate is because, for a variety of reasons, the Mayor, who exercises an executive function analogous to that of the governor of an American state, might dishonour the mandate on which he was elected, go on an ideological or personal journey utterly at odds with the basis on which he was elected or be temporarily incapable of effectively discharging the duties of the office to which he was elected, yet be determined, rather like the captain of the ship in “The Caine Mutiny”, to hang on to the levers of power, even though he is no longer fit to do so. Such a situation might arise in a number of circumstances.

Andrew Slaughter: I am tempted to put the same style of question as was put to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington. If the hon. Member for Surrey Heath favours this departure of the recall, which is even more alien to British constitutional practice, for the mayoral position, does he favour it for any other elected position, for example, his own? The residents of Surrey Heath, conscious of the fact that the hon. Gentleman cannot remember what his constituency is, might like someone who can.

Michael Gove: The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. There is a clear distinction between the gubernatorial office, which is analogous to that of the Mayor of London, and the legislative office, which is analogous to a position in Congress or the Senate. I would not say that being the Member for Surrey Heath is a bit like being a Senator, although it is a little like being a Congressman.
The hon. Gentleman teases me about the precise location of Surrey Heath. I can tell him, because I will be driving there almost as soon as this Committee finishes, that the most effective way to get to it is to drive down the A316 and then the M3. If one then turns off at junction 3, for Lightwater or Bagshot, one will find oneself in Surrey Heath. If he would like me to take him through every village in Surrey Heath, either in conversation at a later date or possibly on a tour, I shall give him a lane-by-lane and street-by-street guide to the constituency that is every bit as detailed as that of any satellite navigation system. As we all know, satellite navigation is a form of global positioning system. I have my own form of GPS—the Gove positioning system—which means that whenever I am in Surrey Heath, I am a happier bunny.
The point that I was about was that, as the hon. Member for Ealing, North pointed out from a sedentary position, Gray Davis, the former governor of California, was subject to a recall amendment. A former mayor of Washington DC, Marion Barry, has also been mentioned. He sets a precedent for being precisely the sort of figure who might have been suitably chastened by being subject to a recall amendment following the sort of petition that we are proposing. We set quite a high threshold, insisting that 10 per cent. of those who had voted in the mayoral election sign a suitably validated petition before there can be any recall vote. This would not be a capricious process.

Stephen Pound: I believe that Marion Barry, the former mayor of DC, was found freebasing cocaine with two hookers in a hotel. One would not in any way make a comparison to the exemplary standards of probity expressed by the current Mayor of London, but surely Marion Barry was in prison and was thus disqualified. So, we already have a failsafe mechanism in London in the highly unlikely event that anything of a similar nature should occur.

Michael Gove: I am grateful for that colourful intervention. The hon. Gentleman points out that if the Mayor were to break the law and to engage in any criminal enterprise, the law of the land would apply. There are a variety of circumstances in which a person exercising an executive function, such as a mayor, or a gubernatorial one, such as Gray Davis, would be appropriately held in check by the power. We all know that the lurid anecdote that the hon. Gentleman brought to the Committee’s attention is not the only example of a mayor, Marion Barry, straying from the high standards that one might expect of an elected mayor. One might argue that some of the policies that he pursued were rather more worthy of chastening than were his colourful recreational activities in some of DC’s hotels.
The threshold that we have set is relatively high, so anybody who sought to press a recall petition on the citizens of London would have to be well organised and well mobilised. Most important, he would have to be in tune with the sentiments of Londoners. Because the threshold is so high, the device could not be used simply to inconvenience the Mayor and to bring London’s governance to a halt. It could be used only if there were a clear public demand and if the Mayor—a future Mayor, I am sure—had palpably failed to live up to the hopes that had been invested in him by those who elected him to the extent that he had radically and dramatically departed from his mandate. For that reason, I hope that, while understandably passing over the opportunity to accept the new clause in the name of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington, the Minister might look favourably on our imaginative transatlantic import.

Jim Fitzpatrick: Before I respond to this debate, may I express my appreciation to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington for his comments on the previous new clause, when he indicated that he was trying to assist me in catching my flight to Berlin for tomorrow’s Employment Ministers’ conference. I believed that I was on the last flight today, but that flight has been cancelled due to weather conditions in Germany. Fortunately, the resourcefulness of the civil service has found me a later flight, so I apologise for anything misleading that I might have said in that respect.
The Government cannot accept either new clause. Both run counter to the fundamental constitutional principles at the heart of the 1999 Act and are ultimately, we would argue, undemocratic. New clause 3 would bar a Mayor or an assembly member who had served two terms of office from being elected for a third term. There is little justification for limiting by statute the number of terms that a mayor can serve in office. It should be for the London electorate to decide who should be Mayor. If the electorate wish to re-elect an incumbent Mayor for three or more terms on the basis of his or her track record, that should be allowed. This is democracy in action; it is what gives the post of Mayor political legitimacy. A statutory limitation on the number of terms that a Mayor can serve would run counter to the fundamental democratic principle that covers all other national and local electoral arrangements in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, because a second-term Mayor would not be allowed the opportunity to stand and face the electorate on his track record, it is possible that he would be less responsive to the needs and concerns of Londoners and less motivated to address the challenges that London faces. That would not be good for the post of Mayor or for London.
New clause 14 would enable a Secretary of State to make regulations to allow the Mayor to be removed from office by a successful petition from a proportion of the London electorate. The Government remain convinced that the use of such a petition to remove the Mayor from office would be completely inappropriate. I was intrigued to read that, in Committee during the scrutiny of the 1999 Act, discussing petitioning, the late, great Eric Forth, who sat for Bromley and Chislehurst, asked the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) whether he would rely on an informal mechanism of people collecting signatures—which would no doubt include the usual Mickey Mouse and Napoleon Bonaparte—and if so, how he would verify the procedure and its cost. Bonapartism is a feature of this debate that has been mentioned several times by both the hon. Member for Surrey Heath and the sitting Member for Bromley and Chislehurst. Clearly, it runs throughthe Bill.

Greg Hands: The new clause clearly refers to
“10 per cent. of the total number of electors participating in the Mayoral election preceding the date of any petition.”
That suggests to me that electors who participated in the election would be deemed to be valid signatories. I assume that Mickey Mouse would not have been allowed to participate in the preceding mayoral election.

Jim Fitzpatrick: The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. The validation of petitions has proven difficult in the past, but subsection (4) of the new clause says:
“Nothing in subsection (2) or (3) affects the generality of the power under subsection (1)”.
Subsection (1) would give the Secretary of State complete power to determine what percentage of signature petitions ought to be allowed.
At the heart of the 1999 Act is the constitutional principle that the Mayor’s democratic legitimacy is ultimately derived from the direct elections held every four years. It is the Mayor’s success at those elections, which involve the whole London electorate, that gives him the democratic mandate to provide strong leadership and strategic direction for London.
To allow the Mayor to be removed from office through a petition would undermine that fundamental principle. It would allow a small proportion of Londoners who were unhappy with the Mayor to override the wishes of the wider London electorate expressed at the ballot box. It could also encourage special interest groups, of whatever persuasion, continually to campaign for the removal of the Mayor by petition whenever they disagreed with a specific mayoral policy or decision. That would almost certainly happen if the default minimum threshold for a valid petition was set at 10 per cent. of the number of people who participated in the last mayoral election, as the new clause proposes.
Based on the last election results, a successful petition would need the support of 186,000 voters to remove the Mayor. That may sound a lot, but it is small compared to the size of the overall London electorate of 5.1 million. It would mean that less than 4 per cent. of the London electorate could decide to get rid of the Mayor.

Michael Gove: Does not membership of the Labour party nationally stand at about 186,000? Therefore, the number of people suitable to elect the next Prime Minister is surely also suitable to decide whether we should have a referendum on the continuation of the mayoral office?

Jim Fitzpatrick: The number of people mentioned in the new clause represents 3.8 per cent. of Londoners. There is another significant factor. The new clause would allow the Mayor to be removed from office but to stand again for re-election at a subsequent by-election. Returning to the comment from my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North about Mayor Barry in Washington, who was re-elected on several occasions despite accusations against him, we could have an endless cycle of petition, removal of the Mayor, re-election of the Mayor, petition and so on. I have not even mentioned the cost, but this could become an expensive and time-consuming process and would prevent the Mayor from focusing on tackling London’s problems.
Furthermore, as I mentioned earlier to the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham, the new clause would give the Secretary of State power to determine the arrangements, including the minimum threshold, for achieving a successful petition.

Greg Hands: Does the Minister not agree that there is an irony in discussing this matter as, if I am not mistaken, he and most Labour Members were instrumental in trying to prevent the current incumbent from being on the ballot paper in the first place in 2000?

Jim Fitzpatrick: Clearly we were singularly successful in that regard.
Such control of the petition process by the Government would cut against one of the key underlying principles of the 1999 Act, which is that the constitutional arrangements for the GLA should be set out, as far as possible, in primary legislation so that the Government of the day cannot easily amend them on the basis of who the Mayor is or is not. Accordingly, the new clause would render the post of Mayor virtually powerless and the incumbent threatened with dismissal by continual submissions from special interest groups.
 Perhaps that is what Opposition Members ultimately want. However, the Government believe in a strong Mayor, whoever he is, with a clear democratic mandate. That person should be able to take forward his vision for London and address the considerable challenges that the capital faces. On that basis, I urge hon. Members not to press the new clauses.

Michael Gove: I can tell that the Minister does not like our new clause, but there were some semi-supportive comments from a couple of Labour Back Benchers, so it is only appropriate that we have a Division when the time comes. It will be revealing to see which members of the Committee believe in having the most democratic model appropriate adopted in relation to London’s Mayor.

Tom Brake: There is much merit to new clause 3. However, I concede that the arguments in favour have perhaps not been deployed as judiciously as possible, and clearly there is still time to regroup, return to the fray and develop the arguments, perhaps in another place. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 6

Utilities
‘(1) The GLA Act 1999 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 351(3), after paragraph (k) insert—
“(l) the efficiency of the suppliers of water and energy,”.
(3) In section 351(4), after paragraph (c) insert—
“(cc) the suppliers of water and energy to Greater London or any part of Greater London,”.
(4) In section 61, after subsection (5) insert—
“(5A) This subsection applies to persons holding the office of regulator of any supplier of water or energy to Greater London or any part of Greater London.”
(5) In section 61(1) for “or (5)” substitute “, (5) or (5A)”.’.—[Tom Brake.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Tom Brake: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Ann Winterton: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 7—Water and sewerage strategy—
‘(1) In section 41 of the GLA Act 1999 in subsection (1) after paragraph (ef) insert—
“(eg) the water and sewerage strategy prepared and published under section 361F below.”
(2) In Part 9 of the GLA Act 1999 (environmental functions) after section 361E insert—
“361F The water and sewerage strategy
(1) The Mayor shall prepare and publish a document to be known as “the water and sewerage strategy for London”.
(2) The water and sewerage strategy for London shall contain—
(a) the Mayor’s assessment as to the consequences of actual and planned development of whatever nature upon the water and sewerage infrastructure within Greater London; and
(b) the Mayor’s proposals and policies for ensuring the water and sewerage infrastructure is adequate for the development referred to in subsection (a) above.
(3) The Secretary of State may give to the Mayor guidance—
(a) about the content of the strategy; and
(b) in relation to the preparation or revision of the strategy.
(4) The guidance that may be given under subsection (3)(b) above includes—
(a) guidance specifying or describing the bodies, persons or organisations which the Mayor must consult; and
(b) guidance as to the consequences of development to which the Mayor must have regard.
(5) In preparing or revising the strategy the Mayor must have regard to any guidance given under subsection (3) above.”.’.

Tom Brake: I hope that, with new clauses 6 and 7, I will be on firmer ground, albeit we will be discussing water. We had a debate earlier today on the importance of climate change, of the Mayor having a strategy that addresses it and of providing him with the flexibility he needs to take on that very important and serious agenda. The new clauses, which relate to water and the utilities, are very much in the vein of providing the Mayor with greater control and say over water and, in relation to new clause 7, sewerage. The provision and use of water will be central to the Mayor’s strategy on climate change, and the new clauses would provide him with an opportunity to gain greater control over the provision of water in London.
I think that most hon. Members would agree that in many respects Londoners have not been particularly well served by some companies that one could mention. I would not necessarily include in that list my own local supplier, Sutton and East Surrey Water, which does a reasonable job, but clearly others get regular headlines for their inability to tackle very significant leakage rates when—apart from the weather that we have had in the last few days—water is in relatively short supply. Certainly, discussions with the local water supplier indicate that in Surrey in particular, where a lot of water is stored in bore holes, the water in the bore holes is at historically low levels.

Jonathan R Shaw: Lady Winterton, I beg to move that the Committee do now adjourn.

Ann Winterton: I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman does not have the Floor; Mr. Brake does.

Jonathan R Shaw: Bore holes.

Tom Brake: The hon. Gentleman may have taken as his cue the word “bore” and thought that that was the appropriate point at which to intervene. Thank you, Lady Winterton, for your protection.
My comments were going to be brief. I was making the point that London is not well served by many of its water companies and that the leakage rate is unacceptable. There are still significant problems in relation to sewerage, particularly at times of heavy rainfall. That is why I hope the Minister will look favourably on the new clauses.

Andrew Pelling: I note well the points that the hon. Gentleman makes about the problems of leakage in the water system. They lead to tremendous disruption on London’s roads in terms of Thames Water’s undertakings. I am not sure whether that has yet affected Carshalton and Wallington directly, but I know that a significant number of unco-ordinated roadworks are to take place in Croydon, which I am sure will adversely affect the hon. Gentleman’s constituents. Does he feel that it might have been a good consideration in this or perhaps related legislation to give the Mayor powers for rather more substantial lane rental charges for utilities, which can be very disruptive and uncaring about the needs of road users?

Tom Brake: I shall not stray too far down the path of lane rental charges, but the hon. Gentleman makes the valid point that despite the availability of such charges, in practice we experience significant delays all over London as a result of various utility works. He represents the borough of Sutton, and Croydon, so he will no doubt be almost as familiar as I am with Beddington lane, which is in his constituency as it is in mine. Traffic on that road is regularly disrupted by utilities, which come in one after the other, rather than in a co-ordinated fashion.
To return to the new clauses, I hope that the Minister sees their validity, certainly in relation to providing the Mayor with additional powers to develop his flexible and responsive strategy on climate change. That is their purpose.

Ann Winterton: I note that Mr. Shaw is seeking to catch my eye.
Debate adjourned.—[Jonathan Shaw.]

Adjourned accordingly at four minutes to Five o’clock till Tuesday 23 January at half-past Ten o’clock.